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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The report examines · forces that direct the location of commercial and 
industrial development within the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area. Its 
purpose is to gain insights for policy direction to sustain the economic 
vitality of the Fully Developed Area (FDA) as the region continues to grow 
in population and expand physically. 
The literature and local empirical research acknowledge that investors 
and other decision makers evaluate three sets of factors in reaching their 
goal of maximizing profits and minimizing risk or uncertainty: (1) relative 
accessibility within a regional marketplace; (2) site characteristics; and 
(3) improvements that include infrastructure and · ancillary uses on which 
the new use depends. 
Land in commercial and industrial use in the seven-county metropolitan 
area increased from 59,550 acres to 73,920 acres between 1980 and 
1990. Over 9,000 of the 14,000+ acres were absorbed in the developing 
communities; 3,700 acres in the Rural Areas and only 100 acres added in 
the two core cities. 
GENERAL LOCATION FACTORS FOR INTRA-METROPOLITAN DECISIONS 
A tally of the specific factors affecting commercial and industrial 
development and the competitiveness of the FDA follows. These factors 
operate in a current environment where: (a) the office market has been 
seriously overbuilt, with many large commercial projects in the central 
business districts and along the major freeways now valued well below 
their outstanding debt; (b) relatively slow growth in manufacturing and 
overbuilt speculative office/warehouse facilities; and (c) geographic 
dispersion of jobs outside the FDA, following population, purchasing 
power, site availability, excellent urban infrastructure and lower 
development costs. 
1 
• Transportation, communication and energy technologies -
accessibility has always been the ·critical influence in shaping urban· 
land use patterns. Access to (and visibility from) major freeways and 
arterials continues to be the key location factor. Older non-
residential districts built in the rail-streetcar era decayed when 
their relative accessibility fell as the automobile became the 
dominant form of transportation. Telecommunication technology will 
likely permit wider geographical separation of functions in the future. 
• Environmental regulations and financial liability of owners of 
contaminated sites - passage of the SuperFund legislation in 1980 
significantly increased financial risk to lenders and investors. 
Reclamation of contaminated sites is extremE:Jly costly and 
redevelopment involves significant time delays in gaining permits. 
Identified sites in the metropolitan area are equally distributed 
between the FDA and the Developing Area (40% each) with remaining 
sites in the Rural Areas. However, Minneapolis and Saint Paul have by 
far the greatest number of contaminated sites. 
• Public incentives and subsidies - tools of tax increment financing 
(TIF) and tax exempt bonding are available to both the FDA and 
Developing Area communities. Core cities or first-ring suburbs that 
use TIF for redeveloping sites must use their increments to cover 
demolition, site assembly costs, etc., whereas developing 
communities can use the same increment to write down land costs on 
"greenfield sites". This does not create a level playing field for the 
older communities. In addition, the major beneficiaries under Fiscal 
Disparities are now the Rural Areas and St. Paul. 
• Attitudes of lending institutions - perception of risk will control 
access to long term debt financing with redeveloped sites generally 
involving higher costs and higher risk. Policies of lending 
institutions for working out loans/writing off losses on existing 
projects have become more important in an over-built commercial 
market suffering from major declines in property value. This factor 
2 
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was important in Health Partners making its final decision to move to 
the Ceridian building in Bloomington. 
• Amenity and "quality of environment" - commercial and industrial· 
developers are increasingly seeking out · amenity sites on the urban 
fringe. The campus setting of an OPUS or Carlson Corporation in the 
western suburbs is an amenity also sought by high tech industries, 
albeit at a much smaller scale. The FDA has far fewer competitive 
sites to offer. Smaller firms sought out the Chaska industrial parks 
because of the landscape setting. 
• Land availability and local zoning - large open sites are essentially 
available only in the developing communities. The zoning and 
subdivision requirements of local municipalities are relatively 
similar in both the FDA and Developing Area -- less stringent in the 
Rural Areas. One industry, however, sought out Chaska because some 
outdoor storage was permitted. 
• Local and state taxes - differential among the metropolitan 
municipalities in the average property tax rate was not cited as a 
significant location factor in our interviews. Statistics on average 
tax rates for the FDA, Developing Area, and Rural Areas for Fiscal 
Year 1992 showed very little difference - 121 %, 120% and 116% 
respectively. However, there is a big difference between the minimum 
and maximum average tax rates - ranging from a low of 83% for rural 
centers to a high of 159% for the FDA. State and local tax rates are 
cited in the empirical literature as affecting the choice of location 
among different metropolitan areas, so this factor may not be ruled 
out entirely. 
3 
BARRIERS FOR THE FULLY DEVELOPED AREA 
Many barriers do exist for. the FDA communities in the commercial and 
industrial markets. Not only do they lack an inventory of vacant land to 
compete with the urban fringe, but they are faced with significantly 
higher development costs. These costs become astronomical when dealing 
with contaminated sites. Twelve barriers are listed below: 
1 . Lack of available land. 
2. Environmental regulations. 
3. Costs for reclamation of contaminated sites - avoidance by lending 
institutions because of ongoing liability to the owner (and under 
foreclosure to the lender). 
4. Preference for high amenity sites. 
5. Parking availability and its cost versus perception of "free parking" 
in the suburban communities. 
6. Obsolete buildings' in the FDA - construction standards give 
buildings a longer physical than functional life span. 
7. Less need for physical proximity among the commercial and 
industrial firms. 
8. Linkage of location decisions with where the decision makers live -
primarily in the higher income suburban communities. 
·s. · Greater uncertainty in getting approvals of a project from adjacent 
property owners - development projects often change the status quo 
for existing residents. 
10. Availability of public subsidies for "greenfield sites" which can be 
used to write down land costs. 
11. Increasing scale of convenience retail and thus far fewer grocery, 
hardware, drug stores, and specialty stores are needed to serve 
trade areas of a given size. 
12. Political fragmentation and lack of a regional influence for guiding 
the market except through the regional infrastructure improvements. 
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LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE RESEARCH 
Insights from our assessment of why decision makers select different 
parts of the metropolitan area for commercial and industrial uses can be 
divid~d into two types. Some are primarily "findings" from the data; 
others are conclusionary and suggest a reorientation of policy in the 
future. The findings are included in the summary above. The conclusions 
and preliminary recommendations are listed below. 
Conclusions: 
1 . Where the region places and how it prices its infrastructure will 
have a significant impact on the market. These investments and 
programs/funds to facilitate recycling of our older industrial and 
commercial districts are levers to manipulate the market. 
2. The challenge is to allocate more resources to cope with the process 
of aging, changing technologies and obsolete investments in the FDA. 
Existing tools of tax increment financing, fiscal disparities, and 
tax-free bonding are insufficient to balance the . higher costs in the 
FDA. Existing tools are totally inadequate to redevelop contaminated 
sites. 
3. Lending institutions are key players in achieving the goals of 
maintaining vitality of the FDA. New policies are needed to balance 
the higher risks in the FDA perceived by these institutions. 
4. Current over-building in the office and speculative light industrial 
market gives the region a breathing space to develop new policies to 
assist reinvestment in the FDA. These can be instituted without 
necessarily constraining investments in the Developing Area. 
5. The ability to provide on-site and "free" parking for employees 
favors the suburban locations over many of the older commercial and 
industrial districts. The solution may either rest in subsidizing 
parking in the older areas or allocating the parking costs to 
5 
employees where on-site parking is available to lessen the impact · 
of this factor on location decisions. Minneapolis is currently 
providing a parking subsidy in the Central Business District as a way 
to quicken absorption of vacant office space. 
6. Political fragmentation and increased reliance on local property 
taxes to finance services contribute to problems of recycling the 
fully built areas. Sharing of commercial/industrial tax base within· 
the region is a very positive step toward equalizing resources, but is 
clearly inadequate to counterbalance the ever present advantages of 
urban fringe sites in a region well provided with highways, sewers 
and natural amenities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Concern has been expressed about the continued economic and social 
vitality of the Fully Development Area (FDA) of the Twin Cities 
metropolitan region and whether regional and local development policies 
are contributing to what the Metropolitan Council has termed "troubles at 
the core". This research focuses on how commercial and industrial 
entrepreneurs, public development agencies and local governments view 
the assets and liabilities of different parts of the region for their 
investments and how they create or respond to incentives to attract 
employment. 
The research first examines the literature on factors influencing the 
location of commercial and industrial enterprises, with emphasis on the 
intra-metropolitan location decisions. At this micro scale, historical 
growth patterns, timing and location of public infrastructure investments, 
local land use polices, development regulations, local· public fiscal 
decisions, and perception of decision makers on risk, amenity and 
convenience join the macro factors affecting the relative attraction of 
the Twin Cities in a national and international marketplace. 
A second section presents a summary of metropolitan data on absorption 
of ·commercial and industrial land into the market between 1980 and 
1990, the exten.t of environmental pollution creating de.velopment 
barriers, and an overview of key fiscal policies: tax increment financing, 
fiscal disparities and differentials in local property tax rates. 
The third part of the research presents findings from a series of key 
informant interviews with a selected number of local decision makers for 
commercial/industrial projects and development of three local case 
studies. The case studies illustrate how decision makers have been 
influenced by the factors defined in the literature and· how local 
communities use their resources to overcome some of the barriers. 
7 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Three traditional factors of. location and relocatic;>n decision making have 
remained constant over time and geographic scale. They are the firm's 
relationship to the technologies of transportation, communication, and 
energy. Other factors impacting location decisions are state and local 
taxes, economic development policies, environmental law and regulation, 
and quality-of-life issues. There is still some disagreement on the 
importance of local taxes. Econometric studies support the premise· that 
taxes are a factor in long-run growth, while survey and case studies are 
less certain of the impact. Economic development policies offering 
financial and other government incentives can be effective tools affecting 
a firm's decision to locate in a community. Environmental laws and 
regulations have increased risk for all parties of real property transfer, 
making the "recycling~ of previously developed property less attractive 
and more costly than ever. The importance of quality-of-life as a factor in 
location decision tends to be sector-specific. It is relatively important 
for high technology firms and may be more important than traditional 
factors in location decisions. This sector views quality-of-life amenities 
as necessary to attract quality employees and to enhance the corporate 
image. In reality, location decisions based on quality-of-life factors tend 
to be a measurement of th-e lifestyle values of the chief executive officer 
and not necessarily of the firm's employees. In total, the literature 
suggests the factors important to location decision tend to place the FDA 
at a competitive disadvantage. 
EVOLUTION OF THE CITY 
As communities continue to evolve and respond to the needs and values of 
their inhabitants, so too do the geographic locations of their system 
components. Garreau1 cites seven functions of cities: (1) industry, (2) 
governance, (3) commerce, (4) safety, (5) culture, (6) companionship, and 
(7) religion. The pattern of development is in part a reflection of cultural 
values. If we look at medieval cities we see reflected the need for safety. 
We find wall-enclosed cities with narrow defensible streets. Primary 
landmarks were likely to be the spires of great catnedrals, bastions and 
8 
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roofs. It is a vertical place not meant to be easily accessible. 
Accessibility did not become important until cities became centers of 
commerce. 
Borchert2 defines cities as the assemblers and processors of the nation's 
resources. He goes on to say that the three most important determinants 
of geographic location of cities are technologies in the fields of 
transportation, communication, and energy. This is true across geographic 
scales and over time. Changes in the technology of transportation, 
communication, or energy are crucial to the growth or decline of cities 
and the location of industry and commerce within the community. 
The emergence of the western European city (our closest relative 
culturally) as a system of public squares (marketplaces) and streets dates 
to a time when medieval towns began to acquire a political, economic and 
territorial identity. The medieval marketplace is worth noting because it 
usually was located at the center of town at the crossroads of the city's 
main highways, and was not associated with church or state. In other 
words, it was located where work-day activities took place and allowed 
the congregation of various business activities to take place. 
The state-of-the-art mode of transportation, then as now, was a primary 
factor in determining the location of these marketplaces. As 
transportation shifted from foot to cart to horse-drawn wagon, cities 
expanded their sphere of influence. Streets needed to be wider and better 
kept if the flo'w of goods was to continue. It gave rise to a new secular 
place in the city identified with the everyday business of making a living 
and spending money. It meant also that a business or a residence now had 
direct permanent contact with the public and was related to a public place 
- the street. This eventually led to what we now know as the city, i.e., a 
CBD laid out on a rectangular street grid. 
This is, of course, a gross over-simplification of city· development. 
Blakeley and Ames, in their discussion of the changing urban context, 
point out several socio-economic factors currently affecting cities3. The 
perception of the central city as unsafe, unsanitary, and unlivable has 
9 
changed its fortune from the traditional planning-based notion that a 
central nodal pattern of development, focused on a central city, provided 
the greatest economic efficiency while creating social equality and 
economic opportunity to a new pattern of development composed of a 
system of communities with no controlling center. Furthermore city 
development is in response to the global market rather than national or 
regional markets. The twin forces of decentralization and 
internationalization are operating to redefine the spatial organization of 
our cities. International development planning requires greater 
communication between fiscal and planning institutions to provide the 
necessary facilities to stay competitive in the global economy. 
Transportation and communication technologies infrastructure will 
become increasing important and must be designed to integrate the city 
fully into the international economy. For Blakeley and Ames, "Urban now 
means s region 4 with a communications capacity to barter in an 
international economy." 
Another aspect in the decentralization of our cities is the privatization of 
what were once public spaces. Garreau refers to this phenomenon as 
Shadow Government. Blakeley and Ames call it limited access 
development. It controls internal and external market forces by curtailing 
impacts on land use from public policy, including forced racial or income 
integration. Its effect is to fragment metropolitan areas by class, race, 
and economic opportunity. 
The latest chapter in the evolution of our cities is a result of the 
American land ethic. 
We abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us. 
A. Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (1949) 
Culturally we exploit land5 • Raw land, sometimes referred to as a "Blank"S, 
is first improved, then goes through a period of use, then becomes 
obsolete, and then finally is despoiled and/or abandoned. The old city 
cores now tend to contain the residue of obsolete physical plants because 
there currently is no good general provision or incvntive for "recycling" 
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the resource of developed land when the _initial development becomes 
obsolete. 
In summary, the evolution of the city is important because it reveals 
three primary factors of location decision for commercial and industrial 
firms which have held true over time and across geographic scales. These 
are changes in the technologies of transportation, communication, and 
energy (and a cultural willingness to embrace them). 
INTRA-METROPOLITAN LOCATION DECISIONS OF INDIVIDUAL FIRMS 
Before discussion of the factors that firms use to select new locations, it 
is necessary to discuss why firms relocate. The primary reason is growth. 
Individual firms simply need more space to manufacture products or 
conduct business operations than is available at the current sites. The 
spatial tendency of Central Business Districts is vertical: while, in the 
Developing Areas the spatial tendency is horizontal. There is little 
question that the Fully Developed Area is at a competitive disadvantage 
when the primary need is for space, especially horizontal space. 
There is a large body of research on the factors affecting inter-
metropolitan or inter-regional commercial and industrial location 
decisions. The majority of the research deals with "traditional" factors 
such as the quality, availability, and cost of labor, proximity to markets 
and suppliers, local tax rates, or hard and soft costs associated with site 
development. Some· research suggests that sectoral clusters develop their 
own set of traditional factors or that these traditional factors are 
growing less important in the face of non-traditional factors, such as 
state and local incentives or other economic development policies7. 
Quality of life concerns are often cited as an important factor. There is a 
less extensive body of research which looks at these factors from an 
intra-metropolitan location perspective. 
Borchert8 distills these factors of geographic differentiation of land 
value within a metropolitan land market down to three basic factors. 
1 1 
• LOCATION (a.k.a. accessibility): It is the spatial location of the 
parcel in the circulation systems. These include transportation 
and communication networks and the flow of water and air 
(polluted or clean). 
• SITE (a.k.a. local resources): These are the internal 
characteristics of the parcel, e.g. elevation, roughness, soils, 
mineral resources, vegetation, drainage conditions. 
• IMPROVEMENTS: The modifications to, and adjacent to, the site so 
that it may be used for some purpose. It includes such things as 
buildings, other structures and infrastructure - sewer, water, and 
roads. 
Cadwallader identified the major traditional location factors affecting 
the location of industry as proximity of raw materials, proximity to 
markets, transportation costs, energy, and the factors of production, i.e. 
costs which are associated with availability of land, labor, and capital 9. 
A Metropolitan Council report10 on trends in industrial migration found 
that transportation and land availability are generally the most important 
factors in the decision process. Other factors cited as important in the 
decision making process were proximity to resources, proximity to other 
firms, and the availability of land and public services. 
That is not to say that other factors do not impact the location decision. 
The Metropolitan Council report questioned whether local tax rate 
differences impacted location decisions and concluded the issue was 
ambiguous, i.e., truces are a disincentive while good public services are an 
incentive. Of course the ambiguity may less·en if the firm's perception is 
that an increase in taxes does not result in a corresponding equal increase 
in public services. Bartik ,, summarizes 14 econometric studies 
completed between 1980 and 1990 which attempt to determine the effect, 
if any, local truces have on the location of C&I within ·metropolitan areas. 
Measures of business activity included such things as employment in a 
community, the number of new manufacturing firms in an MSA by zip code 
areas, and the building permit value of all new anc additional firms. Tax 
12 
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measures used include effective property tax, wage tax rate, average tax 
rate, and the mill rate. Eight of the studies found a significant effect, 
three found a marginal effect, and three found no effect of taxes on the 
location of business. 
Bartik also calculated long-run elasticities for seven of the studies, 
finding a significant effect of taxes on location. In simple terms 
elasticity is a measure of the proportional impact on quantity of price 
changes. In this case, it reflects the rerationship between. the quantity of 
long-run business activity (however defined) in a community and the cost 
(price) of locating in that community. It assumes that local services do 
not change as taxes increase and that service levels and tax burdens in 
equivalent communities in the metropolitan region are held constant.' The 
measured elasticities range from -4.43 to 0.62 and are centered on -1.9 
implying that a 1 O percent increase in tax burden would result in a 19 
percent reduction in employment for the community in the long-run. One of 
these studies was conducted using the Twin Cities metropolitan area. 
McGuire12 used data on 119 MCDs in the seven county region and found a 
significant effect of the tax rate on location activity. The tax measure 
used was an adjusted mill rate and the business activity measure was 
building permit value. The long-run elasticity from this study was -1.59. 
Overall, these studies suggest that taxes are a factor in a firm's intra-
metropolitan location decision. 
Bartik's conclusion is that a wide variety of state and local economic 
development policies can significantly affect the long-run growth 
patterns of cities. 
The advent of the industrial park, zoning, environmental regulation, and 
other public planning policies have also impacted the location decision 
process by reducing the number and location of possible sites. Chapman13 
points out that various instruments of environmental policy, though 
not specifically designed as land use controls, nevertheless serve this 
function. There is evidence that they do affect the location of 
manufacturing industry. The full impact of environmental laws has not 
been studied extensively, but it is already certain they greatly affect 
13 
location decision making by increasing risk in property transfer, 
especially in older industrial corridors. Environmental liability is not a 
new risk for lenders, owners, or investors. It is the scope of liability that 
has changed. With the passage of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liabilities Act of 1980 (CERCLA or the 
Superfund Act), risk to lenders and investors increased substantially. 
Under the Superfund Act, and other various state and local laws and 
statutes passed subsequently, liability for environmental contamination 
is strict, joint, several, and retroactive14. It means that any party 
associated with a real property transaction at the time of discovery of 
environmental contamination can be held liable for all clean up costs, 
even if the party is innocent of any actual responsibility for the 
contamination. To reduce their risk, all segments of the real estate 
industry came together, in early 1990, in an attempt to define due 
diligence. With the aid of the American Society for Testing and Materials 
(ASTM), the real estate community set out to define practical, concrete 
steps a buyer, seller, lender, tenant, and landlord should undertake to 
assess the environmental status of a property. The final result of this 
standard would be a limitin·g of liability where environmental due 
diligence had taken place. The final standards set by this body was due 
early in 19931 s. 
The state of Minnesota passed legislation in 1988 aimed at the same goal. 
The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) oversees the Property 
Transfer/Voluntary Cleanup Program which provides information and 
technical assistance to business and industry concerning environmental 
liability associated with real property transaction. In 1992, the 
Legislature passed the Land Recycling Act to further voluntary action for 
the investigation and clean up of contaminated properties by offering 
incentives to owners, buyers, and lenders. The MPCA may also provide no-
action letters which limit the liability faced by partie~ involved in a 
property transfer to the contamination which they subsequently 
contribute and for which they. are directly responsible. 
14 
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There are several additional state and federal agencies involved in the 
administration, permitting, and oversight of environmental regulations, 
such as the EPA, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Minnesota 
Department of Agriculture, and the Minnesota Department of Natural 
Resources. The environmental permit process can be a tremendous burden 
to developers, lenders, buyers, etal. in land transactions and development. 
From the perspective of the developer the governing agencies are quick to 
say no· and slow to say yes, i.e. grant a permit (see appendix Federal 
Wetland Jurisdiction: Sequence of Analysis for an example). Blakeley and 
Ames found that "permit requirements are so onerous that development of 
many urban locations is often proscribed due to toxic waste, building, 
parking, or local environmental regulations."16 
Of the principal participants in the property transfer process, lenders 
seem to be the most conscious of the additional risks involved with 
environmental law. Lenders tend to be the party .most likely to stop the 
transaction based on environmental assessment of the property17 . There 
have been very few cases where a lending in~titution has been held 
responsible, but the magnitude of the settlements would make anyone 
conservative in future action.1 s 
Another aspect of environmental regulation is that third parties can more 
easily block or delay development on a single issue. As a result, 
developers prefer the suburbs where there tend to be fewer regulations 
and interest groups to block their plans. 
Quality of life is often mentioned as a factor in site selection. The 
literature suggests location decisions of technology-based firms are more 
dependent on non-traditional factors such as quality of life.19 Garreau 
gives many examples of high tech firms moving out of the city to bucolic 
sites. It is seen as way to attract and keep good employees, but is also 
important to corporate identity. But what exactly is quality of life? There 
are as many descriptions of quality of life as there are studies about 
quality of life. For Garreau quality of life is "nice" and defines it as "We 
know it when we see it". This is as good a definition as any. It is the 
individual's or firm's perception of the community'c; services, lot size, 
1 5 
schools, cultural activities, parks, crime; availability of •tree" parking, or 
any other amenity. It is what makes people feel safe and secure. The 
perception, whether it is factual or not, is that the central cities are not 
as safe and secure a place to live as the developing ring and therefore the 
quality of life is lower. 
Garreau defines some "laws• underlying development. Though some of 
these laws may seem more satirical comment than factual, they do seem 
to reflect development reasoning and practice. From these laws, the prime 
consideration in a company's relocation decision is that the commute of 
the chief executive officer must always become shorter. This may carry 
more weight than one would first suppose. William H. Whyte, in his book 
City, shows a map of thirty-eight firms which moved from New York City 
to the area around Stamford and Greenwich, Connecticut. Average distance 
from the new firm location to where the chief executive lived at the time 
of the move was eight miles. The primary reason given for the site 
selection was "to better meet the quality of life needs of their 
employees". It seems quality of life issues may sometimes be used as the 
"public" explanation for a firm's behavior, when it fact, the location 
· decision was based on some other factor. 
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REGIONAL PATTERNS 
MCD ATTRIBUTE MAPPING: PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of attribute mapping by municipality (MCD) is to see if any 
geographical patterns emerge in. the seven-county metropolitan region. 
The region is divided into four planning areas of interest. They are the 
Core - Minneapolis and Saint Paul, the Fully Developed Area - inner ring 
suburbs, the Developing Area - second ring suburbs, and the Rural Area -
this includes Free-standing growth centers (Map 1 Planning Areas). The 
purpose is to determine which, if any, of the planning areas have an· 
advantage or are at a disadvantage with respect to the development of 
commercial and industrial land in the region. · 
The methodology itself is quite simple. Once the factors have been 
identified and variable values recorded, the data base is queried to find 
the outliers, i.e. high and low values for a particular variable of the MCDs. 
The outliers are defined as the top and bottom 1 O percent of the MCDs for 
a variable. These outliers are mapped to see if any geographic patterns 
emerge. Of particular interest are patterns that differentiate the four 
planning areas. In other words, do the patterns generated suggest that any 
of the planning areas have an advantage or are at a disadvantage based on 
the variable queried? 
The research is designed to make use of MAPINFQ® software, a geographic 
information system for desktop computers. Data were collected from 
several sources including the 1990 Census, Minnesota Pollution Control 
Agency, Metropolitan Council, Minnesota Department of Revenue Local 
Government Services Division, and the League of Minnesota Cities. The 
original list of factors by which the MCDs were to be compared consisted 
of commercial and industrial land use, number and value of building 
permits, number of environmental clean-up sites, tax increment financing, 
fiscal disparity, average tax rate, and employment data. 
17 
MAP 1: PLANNING AREAS 
~ CORE ( Minneapolis) (1) 
~ CORE (Saint Paul) (1) 
0 DEV8.0PED (25) 
EJ DEVB..CPNG (68) 
0 Rl.RAL (63) 
■ RURAL (Centers) (39) 
• 
OAT A SOURCE: Metropolitan Council 
PLANNING AREAS 
... 
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The factors were selected to reflect the intra-metropolitan location 
attractiveness of sites to ~ommercial and industrial firms, as implied. by 
the literature review and interviews held during the early portion of the 
research. Environmental liabilities and regulations emerged as a primary 
factor in the location decision process for .Ill parties (seller, buyer, 
lender, contractor, etc.) involved in the transfer of real property. 
Environmental variables are lfsted for 1992 only, because much of the 
legislation passed to regulate this area was not in effect until the late 
seventies and early eighties. Until then, all locations were at 
approximately the same place in terms of environmental liability (i:e. 
attractiveness for C&I development) and differentiation did not begin 
until the early eighties. 
The primary problem encountered during the research came from changes 
in the way the original data are collected and reported by each agency. For 
example, the method the Department of Revenue uses to compute the tax 
increment net tax has changed twice since 1980. Initially they used 
assessed values of properties within the tax increment district and now 
they use the tax capacity of the district as the basis of the computation. 
There is no formulaic way to reconcile the two methodologies. Therefore 
it is difficult to map changes over time for many variables. 
The difficulties the data presented were overcome by the decision to 
present "snapshots in time" of the MCDs in the region. Data were collected 
for years from 1980 to 1993. Some variables have data for one year and 
others have data for up to four years. Whenever possible, the years 1980 
and 1990 were included for each variable. If it was not possible to get 
data for those two years, the nearest available years were used. 
Mapping is by individual MCD and not planning area because it allows the 
patterns to flow across planning area boundaries. This _way one can more 
readily see whether or not the planning areas capture the pattern or the 
planning areas are independent of the pattern. Differences between 
planning areas are more easily described and shown in tabular form or 
with graphs. 
19 
The data are heavily skewed for most factors. This is not unexpected 
because most of the variables have a direct relationship to the amount of 
industrial and commercial land use in an MCD. So one should see higher 
values in the few MCDs with large amounts of C&I land use and small 
values in the majority of MCDs. In most cases, the variable's average value 
plus or minus one standard deviation could be used for the cut-off point 
for mapping. The resulting group of outliers is approximately equal to the 
top and bottom 1 0 percent of cases. It is important to .look not only at the 
actual value amount of gain or loss for an MCD, but also the percent of 
change in the amount of a given variable. This way, small value MCDs are 
not excluded from the analysis simply because they did not have large 
actual increases or decreases. By using these two measures of change, 
identification of any patterns which exist and differentiate the planning 
areas should be possible. 
RES UL TS OF A ITRI BUTE MAPPING 
Commercial and Industrial Land Use 
Not surprisingly, the Core and Developed Areas had little or modest 
changes in the total amount of C&I land use from 1980 to 1990 - 0.79% 
and 8.53% respectively. The Developing and Rural Areas experienced gains 
in C&I land use of 40% and 49% respectively (Table 1 ). 
Building Permit Data 
The building permit data for the year 1990 show the Core Area holding 
nearly a 34% share of the estimated market value of new construction 
(permit types 318-329) and a 45% share of additions (permit type 417) in 
the region (Table 2). In 1992, the Core Area's share of new construction 
had dropped off to 3.75%, but its share of additions remained nearly 
constant at 43%. The remaining planning· areas maintain relatively stable 
shares of the estimated mar-ket value of the building permits. Most of the 
estimated market value of new construction permits is going to the 
20 
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COMMERCIAL and INDUSTRIAL LAND USE 
CHANGE IN ACRES OF C&I LAND USE FY 1980 TO 1990 
1990 1980 
Planning Area Count C & I Total Acres C & I Total Acres 
Core Total 2 13,726 13.618 
Core Minneaoolis 1 7,383 7,390 
Core Saint Paul 1 6,343 6,228 
Developed 25 16,503 15,206 
Developing 681 32,503 23,214 
Rural Total 102 11 .188 . 7,511 
Rural 63 8,528 5,319 
Rural Centers 39 2,660 2,192 
Grand total 197 73,9201 59,5491 
CHANGE IN ACRES OF COMMERCIAL LAND USE FY 1980 TO 1990 
1990 1980 I 
Planning Area Count Commercial Acres Commercial Acres 
Core Total 2 3.678 3,527 
Core Minneaoolis 1 1,775 1 .640 
Core Saint Paul 1 1,903 1,887 
Developed 25 6,4341 5,6541 
Developing 68 11,7671 6,808 
Rural Total 102 4,027 2.306 
Aural . 63 2.700 1,177 
Rural Centers 39 1,327 1,129 
Grand total 197 25,9061 18,295 
CHANGE IN ACRES OF INDUSTRIAL LANO USE FY 1980 TO 1990 
1990 1980 
Planning Area Count Industrial Acres Industrial Acres 
Core Total 2 10,048 10.091 
Core Minneaoolis 1 4,568 4,588 
Core Saint Paul 1 5,480 5,503 
Developed 25 10,069 9,552 
Developing 68 20,736 16,406 
Rural Total 102 7. 161 5.205 
Rural 63 5,828 4,142 
Rural Centers 39 1,333 1,063 
Grand total 197 48,014 41,254 
DATA SOURCE: MetropolitaD Council.Preliminary Land Use data 1SMay 1.993 
Table 1 
% Change from 
1980 C & I 
0.79 
-0.09 
1.85 
8.53 
40.01 
48.95 
60.33 
21.'35 
24.13 
% Change from 
1980 Commercial 
4.28 
8.23 
0.85 
13.80 
72.84 
74.63 
129.40 
17.54 
41.60 
% Change from 
1980 Industrial 
-0.43 
-0.44 
-0.42 
5.41 
26.39 
37.58 
40.70 
25.40 
16.39 
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BUILDING PERMIT DATA TABLE 2 
ESTIMATED MARKET VALUES FY 1990 & 1992 
Estimated Market Value of New Const. Permm: "lo of Total Estimated Market Value New ConstJ 
Planning Area Count 1990 1992 1990 1992 
Core Total 2 373.034.776 7,793.601 33.92% 3.75% 
Core Minneaoolis 1 360.841,810 4,030.000 32.82°/o 1.94% 
Core Saint Paul 1 12,192.966 3,763.601 1.11% 1.81% 
Develoced 24 126.157.747 47,547.298 11 .47%1 22.89% 
Develocing 671 576,093.2881 121.005.708 52.39%1 58.25~ .. 
Rura1 Total 102 24.311,095 31.381.4551 2.21%1 15.11% 
Rural 63 12.061.908 19.448.220 1.10%1 9.36% 
Rural Centers 39 12.249. 187 11 ,933,2351 1.11% 5.74c~ 
Grano total 1951 1 ,099.596.9061 207,728.0621 100.00%1 100.00% 
I Estimated MarKet Vaiue of Adcit1ons Permrts % of Total Estimatec Man<et Value Additions Planning Area Count 1990 I 1992 1990 I 1992 
Core Total 2 230.143.8761 197 .088 .200 44.64%1 42.53% 
Core Minneaoohs 1 102.222.2601 119.072.4701 19.83°1.T 25.70% 
Core Saint Paul 1 127.921,6161 78,015,730 24.81°/el 16.84% 
Develocec I 241 150.162.7001 112.239.5731 29.12%1 24.22% 
Develocing I 671 122.320 ,384 I 142.949.1281 23.72%1 30.85¾ 
Rural Total ,02 12.979.3741 11 .080.814 2.52%1 2.39% 
Rural 63 4.079.2241 1.882.168 0.79%1 0.41 ~~ 
Rural Centers 39 8.900.1501 9,198.646 1.73%1 1.99¾ 
Grano total 1951 515.606.3341 463.357.7151 100.00%1 100.00% 
_ DATA SOURCE: MrtropoUtan Council, Bulldin& Permit Data (permit typa31S-329 & 417) 
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Developing Area - 52% in 1990 and 58% in 1992, as well as approximately 
25% of additions. It is worth noting that Minneapolis and Saint Paul differ 
substantially in the amount and estimated value of new construction in 
1990. Minneapolis had nearly $361 million, while Saint Paul had only $12 
million of new construction value. This is missed when viewing them 
together as a single planning area. Of the $1.1 billion total of the 
estimated value new construction in 1990, Minneapolis' share was $360 
million or 33%. 
Environmental Liability 
The environmental liability of an MCD is here defined as the number of 
environmental clean-up sites within the MCD. The average number of 
clean-up sites per MCD in the Core Area is 92, in the Developed Area it is 
6, in the Developing Area it is 5, and in the Rural Area it is 2 (Table 3, Map 
2, and Map 3). If the measure of environmental liability is redefined as 
sites per square mile the result for the planning areas from the Core Area 
outward are 1.8, 0.9, 0.4, and 0.1 sites per square mile respectively. When 
looking at only those sites already listed or suspected as federal and 
state Superfund sites, differences are even greater with the Core Area 
having 1.03 sites per square mile, the Developed Area with 0.36 sites per 
square mile, the Developing area with 0.13 sites per square mile, and the 
Rural area with 0.03 sites per square mile. 
The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency recognized the need to develop 
some method to expedite environmental clean up of contaminated sites. 
The result is the Property Transfer Program. Of the 59 sites working with 
the Property Transfer Program, 32 are in the Core Area cities. This is a 
double-edged sword. It does allow sites to be developed or redeveloped 
that would otherwise remain unused, but it also means greater 3rd party 
involvement in the property transfer. Generally leading to longer and more 
expensive transactions. 
23 
ENVIRONMENT AL LIABILITY 
NUMBER OF SITES LISTED: NOVEMBER 199.2 
Total Number 
Planning Area Count of Sites % of Total Sites 
Core Total 2 184 21.96 
Core Minneaootrs , , 0, ,2.05 
Core Saint Paul 1 83 9.90 
Developed I 25 1521 18.14 
Oeveloplng 681 3231 38.54 
Rural Total 102 179 21.36 
Rural 63 86 10.26 
Rural Centers 39 93 11.10 
Grand total I 1971 8381 100.001 
DATA SOURCE: MN PCA, Master Facilities Llst Nonmber Im 
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Number of 
Sites s,er MCD Total SQ Ml 
92.00 103.41 
,o,.oo 52.58 
83.00 50.83 
6.081 162.581 
4.751 765.941 
1.751 1730.211 
1.37 1660.11 
2.38 70.10 
4.251 2762. i 41 
Table 3 
Sites per SQ Ml 
1.779 
i .92~ 
1 .633 
0.935 
0.422 
0.103 
0.052 
1 .327 
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ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 
MAP 2: ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 
Highest Risk Potential 
■ 21 to 75 (3) 
■ 10 to 20 (6) 
D 6 to 10 (9) 
D o to s (179) 
C, 
DATA SOURCE: Minnesota Pollution Control Agency 
Risk Potential is defined as the total number of CERCLIS, NLP, PLP,SW_PER, and HW_PER aites in an MCD. 
See the appendix for descriptions of the variables. 
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ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 
MAP 3: TOTAL NUMBER OF SITES 
Av1rag1 (4) + StdOtv (10) 
■ (SrTE_TOTAL > 14) (9) 
D all others (188) 
DATA SOURCE: Minnesota Pollution Control Agency 
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Percent of Tax Capacity Captured by TIF 
The average captured increment as a percent of tax capacity value for the 
region is 7.87% (Table 4). The Core Area percent is slightly higher than· 
average at 11.74%, while the lowest average for a planning area is the 
Developing Area at 5.62%. It is more interesting to look at the clustered 
distribution of MCDs with high capture rates (Map 4). This is suggests the 
use of financial incentive packages available the MCDs is not defined by 
planning area, but rather by those MCDs with entrepreneurial city 
management - that is, the willingness and sophistication to use such tools 
to attract business. 
Fiscal Disparities 
Rural Area of the metropolitan region contribute 3.59% of the total · 
contribution to fiscal disparities, while receiving 11.23% of the 
distribution (Table 5). This results in a difference (distribution less 
contribution) as a percentage of contribution of 212%. In other words, the 
distribution is more than three times the contribution. The Developed Area 
contributes 28.71 % of the total contribution, while receiving 20.4% of the 
distribution resulting in a difference as a percentage of contribution of 
-28.92%. The remaining two planning areas essentially break even. 
However, once again it should be noted that the Core Area cities' 
difference as a percentage of contribution differ greatly with Minneapolis 
at -28.57% and Saint Paul at + 110.95%. 
Average Tax Rates 
The average tax rates for cities in the region is 118.6% of capacity. The 
Rural area shows a greater range of rates than the other planning areas, 
but its significance of this variability is arguable (Table 6). One 
interesting note is the Core and Developing areas have the least degree of 
variability. Those with higher than average tax rates tend to be found in 
Carver, Ramsey, and Scott counties (Map 7). Most of the MCDs with low 
average tax rates are in Anoka, Dakota, or Washington counties (Map 8). 
27 
This suggests location differences in average tax rates are county-related 
rather than planning area-related. 
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TAX INCREMENT 
FY 1990 
TAX CAPACITY VALUE 
Planning Area Count TOTAL CAPTURED INCREMENT 
Core Total 2 584,100,263 68,547,574 
Core Minneaoolis 1 395.677;742 49,810,087 
Core Saint Paul 1 188.422,521 18,737,487 
Developed 251 551.803, 161 38,234,6561 
Developing 681 768.348,0601 43, 198,8531 
Rural Total 1021 57,414,288 4,497,1271 
Rural 63 24.223.337 1,578.440 
Rural Centers 39 33,190,951 2,918,687 
Grand total 197 1,961.665 ,7721 154,478,2101 
DAT A SOURCE: MN DepL or Revenue. Local Government Division 
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TABLE 4 
% of TOTAL 
CAPTIJRED 
11.74% 
12.59% 
9.94% 
6.93% 
5.62% 
7.83% 
6.52% 
8.79% 
7.87% 
TAX INCREMENT 
MAP 4: TAX INCREMENT CAPTURED 
Average (4.11 %) + StdDev (7.54%) 
■ % CAPTIJRED > 11.65% (18) 
0 all others (179) 
DATA SOURCE: Oepan:ment of Revenue. Local Govemment SeMces 
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FISCAL DISPARmES 
TAX CAPACITY: FY 1990 
Planning Area Count Contribution Distribution 
Core Total 2 73,692,596 78,159,473 
Core Minneaoolis 1 55.398.808 39,569,297 
Core Saint Paul 1 18.293,788 38,590.176 
Developed I 251 76,063,5581 54,064, 7441 
Developing I 68 105,705,3671 102,998,4081 
Rural Total 102 9,521,5531 29,753,0931 
Rural 63 4,400.327 18,764.201 
Rural Centers 39 5.121,226 10,988.892 
Grand total I 1971 264,983,074 264,975,718 
I count Difference as a Contribution as a Planning Area •.4 of Contribution •10 of Total Contribution 
Core Total I 2 · 6.061 27 .81 
Core Minneaoolis 1 -28.57 20.91 
Core Saint Paul 1 110.95 6.90 
Developed I 25 -28.921 28.71 I 
Developing I 681 -2.561 39.891 
Rural Total 1021 212.481 3.591 
Rural 63 326.431 1.661 
Rural Centers 39 114.58 1.931 
Grand total I 197 0.001 100.001 
DAT A SOURCE: DepL or Rn-mue, Local Government Seni~ 
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TABLE 5 
Difference 
4,466.876 
_, 5.829.511 
20.296.387 
-21.997.814 
. -2,706.978 
20,192.113 
14.318.146 
5.873.967 
-45.803 
Distribution as a 
•1o of Total Distribution 
29.50 
14.93 
14.56 
20.40 
38.87 
11 .23 
7.08 
4.15 
100.00 
FISCAL DISPARITIES 
MAP 5: FISCAL DISPARmES 
Biggest Gainers in dollars 
■ > Avt Contrib & Gain > 1 Mil m 
O all others (190) 
D 
DATA SOURCE: Oepanmem cf Revenue. Local Govemmem Services 
DOC ID l 90Contrlb l 900I1trlb · I to 
BLAINE ! 33668<46, 6112554\ 
c::cx::N RAPDS 3016123: 6601120: 
~PLEVAU.EY i 1583553= 40059431 
• --VN PARK ! 4403030: 7412262= 
MAP\.EGRJVE ! 2114323: 46114341 
N=N~ 1859905' 2979991 1 
ST. PAUL 182937881 38590176; 
= 
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FISCAL DISPARITIES 
MAP 6: FISCAL DISPARITIES 
Gain > 300% and Contrib > Mean 
■ Gain > 300% and Contrib > 80340 (15) 
D all others (182) 
0 
DATA SOURCE: Oepanment of Revenue. Local Government Services 
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AVERAGE TAX RATES TABLE 6 
AVERAGE TAX RATES FOR cmES ONLY FY 1992 
Planning Ara COUNT AVERAGE! MIN MAXI STD DEV 
Core Total 2 128.246 122.218 134.274 8.525 
Core Minneacolis 1 122.218 
Core Saint Paul 1 134.274 
Developed 231 120.931 I 104.3361 159.4971 11.176 
Developing 63 119.2291 100.501 136.5221 8.347 
Rural Total 51 116.279 82.6031 147 .534 14.506 
Rural 14 112.591 100.017 126.0501 7.288 
Rural Centers 37 117.6751 82.603 147.534 16.303 
Grand total , 1391 118.5581 82.6031 159.4971 ii .507 
DA TA SOURCE: DepL or ReTmue, Local Government Semca 
AUETAX~n 
Count Midpoint One SlJlllbol •quals approximat•I~ .SO oc:c:urrenc:es 
1 81 ■ 
o as 
0 89 
4 g3 
1 g7 
4 101 
12 105 
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15 113 
24 117 
25 121 
17 125 
10 129 
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2 137 
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0 153 
0 157 
1 161 ■ 
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AVERAGE TAX RATE 
MAP 7: HIGH AVERAGE TAX RATE 
Averag,(118.558)+StOev(11.507) 
■ AveTax92 > 130.065 (18) 
D all ethers (179) 
• 
DATA SOURCE: Depanment of Revenue. Local Govemment Services 
DOC ID AveTax92 
CENTERVU£ 136.5221 
HILLTOP 159 .49 
CAAVER 146.98 
~EN 133.908 
HNJBl..AG 135.62 
133.026 
132.564 
131.483 
131.173 
133.443 
134.27 
130.593 
147 .534 
144.801 
141 
134.588 
132.11 
134.424 35 
AVERAGE TAX RATE 
MAP 8: LOW AVERAGE TAX RATE 
Avuag1(118.558)-StO1v(11 .507) 
■ 82.603 to 107.051 (21) 
D all others (176) 
c:, 
DATA SOURCE: Dec,anment of Revenue, Local Government SeMces 
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MCD Descriptive Stats Table 7 
Planning Areu Oeseripttve Stat NO· NEWPER90 VAL NEWPER90 NO AODPER90 VAL ADOPER90 
-
All Arna Count 
Q.m 
Average 
Percentile Rank of Average 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Max/ Sum 
197 
2,491 
13 
80% 
2 
41 
0 
516 
21•1. 
197 
1,099,596,906 
5,581,710 
91% 
73.691 
35,452.717 
0 
360.841.810 
• 33•1. 
197 197 
6,631 515,606,334 
34 2,617.291 
82"1. 85% 
1 10,000 
127 12,379,475 
0 0 
1,282 127.921.616 
191/. 25% 
Descriptive Stat CCM.ERCIALSO INDUSTRIALSO COMMERCIAL90 INDUSTRIAl.90 
Count 
Q.m 
· Average 
Percentile Rank of Average 
Mun 
Standard Deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Max/ Sum 
197 
18.295 
93 
50•1.1 
23 
224 
0 
1,887 
10%1 
Descriptive Stat FD CONTR1890 
Count 
Sum 
Average 
Percentile Rank of Average 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Max/ Sum 
197 
264,983,0741 
1,345.0921 
94•1.1 
80.340 
4,863.161 
0 
55,398.808 
21 "lel 
Oesctipttve Stat POPSO 
Count 
Slffl 
Average 
Percantile Rank of Average 
Mean 
Standard Oe'tiaticn 
Mrimum 
Maximum 
Max/ sum 
1971 
1 .985,6501 
10.079 
79% 
2. 150 
33,744 
0 
370.951 
19% 
Descriptive Stat ENVR SUM 
Count 
SL.m 
Average 
Percentile Rank of Average 
Mun 
Standard Deviation 
Mirirrum 
Maximum 
Max/ sum 
197 
1,072 
5 
74% 
2 
14 
0 
139 
13°/o 
37 
197 197 197 
41.254 25.906 48,014 
209 132 244 
s1•1. 79•1. 79°10 
33 321 45 
594 274 612 
0 0 0 
5,503 1 ,9031 5.480 
13•1. 7"1. 11 •1. 
FD DISTRl890 Tl -,,. CAPT90 Tl NETTAX90 
197 1971 197 
264,975.718 NA 157 .069 .4 72 
1 .345.054 4.11•1.1 797,307 
76% 531/. 81 •1. 
296,8481 0.00°1.1 0 
4,075.144 7.54•/o 3.955.207 
0 0.009/o 0 
39.569.2971 75.55•1. 50.645.i97 
15"1. NAI 32% 
POP90 EM?t.OYSO EMPLOY90 
197 1971 197 
2.288.721 1,040.010 1.291,804 
11,618 5.279 6.557 
n% 84"1. 83"1. 
2,441 290 558 
34,355 24.243 24,754 
0 0 0 
368,383 276,310 278.314 
16% 27% 22o/. 
eMR SITES A VET AX R.A. ic92 
197 139 
838 NA 
4 118.558 
73,-. •6% 
1 118.893 
10 11 .S07 
.. 
o· 82.603 
101 159.497 
12% NA 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The findings suggest that it may not be appropriate to make policy 
decisions based on data gathered by planning areas. This is particularly 
true of the Core area, where the two cities, Minneapolis and Saint Paul, 
have not recently enjoyed the same growth. This is revealed when looking 
at the building permit, tax increment, fiscal disparities, and average tax 
rate data for the two cities. In 1990, Minneapolis had 300 times the 
amount of estimated value of new building value than Saint Paul (Table 2): 
Minneapolis has two times the total tax increment tax capacity value of 
Saint Paul, $396 million to $188 million, and captures a larger percentage 
of the capacity, 12.59% to 9.94% (Table 4). And while Minneapolis is a 
sizable net contributor to Fiscal Disparities, Saint Paul is one of the 
largest net recipients (Table 5, Map 5 and Map 6). However, one very 
important factor affecting the location of C&I which is common to both 
cities is their relatiye high level of environmental risk. 
If one factor of those factors investigated had to be selected as having 
the. greatest impact on controlling the location of commercial and 
industrial development in the FDA, it would be environmental liability. 
This is because environmental regulations have so many corollary effects. 
The monies generated with tax increment financing in the Core Area goes 
toward environmental clean-up costs rather than to land cost write-down, 
government agencies must assume a greater role in property transfer 
process, and all parties normally a part of the transfer of real property 
are facing greater uncertainty as a result of the regulations. 
The Fully Developed Areas are certainly at a disadvantage based on this 
factor (Map 2 and Map 3). While the distribution of sites across the Fully 
Developed and Developing Areas, relative to the total number of sites, is 
about equal at 40%, the average number of sites per MCD within the 
planning areas differs significantly. The Core Area averages 92 sites per 
MCD, while the Developed Area averages six sites, and the Developing Area 
almost five sites per MCD. The environmental regulations, in effect, are a 
form of regional zoning. Map 2 m~y be viewed then as an environmental 
risk zoning map. It shows the core cities as the riskiest places to locate. 
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It shows also which MCDs may face similar environmental challenges in 
the future. These tend to follow the older industrial corridors developed 
along the Minnesota and Mississippi rivers . 
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FINDINGS FROM KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS 
AND· INDUSTRY REPORTS 
Overbuilding in the office and speculative industrial/warehouse space in 
the 1980s have flattened absorption rates of new space and reduced 
income streams for building owners in both the Fully Developed Area and 
the developing communities. The early 1990s are thus "buyers" rather than 
"sellers" markets for the service, retail and· industrial sectors. 
OFFICE MARKET 
In the office market, absorption of new space has declined by 11.5% each 
year for the last five years. Downtown Minneapolis experienced a 20% 
vacancy rate in its Class A buildings and the southwest suburban sector 
17% during 1992. Net rental rates declined by 15% in 1992 and effective 
rents for building owners ranged from a negative $2/square foot to a 
positive $1/sq. ft. after all tenant improvements, commissions and other 
leasing costs20. 
Cutbacks in defense-related and other businesses have increased the 
supply of sub-leased space - 500,000 sq. ft. at the end of 1992 - thus 
further depressing rents. 
The declining.·assessed value of downtown Minneapolis office buildings 
motivated the City in 1993 to adopt a new policy to subsidize parking for 
new employers in the central business district. The adopted policy 
allows the city to lease space from parking owners,. thus making the space 
tax exempt. Public Works will pay owners the market rate minus the tax 
savings and lease to the new employees at that rate, plus 4% for 
administrative costs. One space per 1,000 sq. ft. of leasable area is 
allocated, with a cap of 1500 spaces. This would cover 115 · million square 
feet of new office absorption, equivalent to 37 percent of existing vacant 
space in late 1992. Over the next five years · spaces in the peripheral 
parking ramps can be leased to new employees to capture only the 
operating costs (not debt service). Since the metroJJolitan area has an 
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estimated eight-year supply of space, this policy is designed to quicken 
absorption and thus improve the relative competitive position of the 
downtown location in a glutted market21. 
INDUSTRIAL MARKET 
Manufacturing employment has grown very slowly in the metropolitan area 
over the past year but vacancy rates have dropped to 4 percent (still 10 
million square feet however), the lowest in fifteen years22.The most 
seriously over-built segment of the market is the multi-tenant building -
vacant space estimated at 7.2 million square feet23. Absorption of new 
space is quite low given increasing up-front cash requirements from 
developers. 
The second and third tier suburban communities are getting most of the 
new industrial buildings - including the southwest suburban areas of 
Chanhassen, Chaska and Shakopee and the northwest Champlin area. 
However, over-building makes the office-showroom market softest in the 
southwest and south-central suburbs with a 1 O percent vacancy rate. 
The problem for the inner cities is lack of vacant land that is not 
contaminated. A survey completed for the St. Paul Port Authority in 1991 
identified only 17 available sites, all but two less than 6.5 acres in size. 
Thirteen of these sites are contaminated and remediation is calculated at 
around $18 million - i.e., a cost of just under $1,500 per job created for 
remediation alone. Total development costs per job were calculated at 
$15,341 24 • Available redevelopment resources under TIF are insufficient 
to handle this extra cost and thus the city is unable to remain competitive· 
with the developing communities. 
Geographic dispersion of jobs beyond the Fully Developed Area is expected· 
to continue for many reasons: continuing dispersion of population and 
labor force; lack of large sites for growing industry in the FDA; lender 
avoidance of environmental liability associated with redeveloped sites; 
lack of state and federal resources to help the fully developed 
communities redevelop/recycle older industrial districts; excellent 
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highway accessibility for the developing communities; the extensive 
regional interceptor system of the Metropolitan Waste Control 
Commission serving the developing suburbs; low cost land in the 
developing area that has full utility services, marketed .with public 
subsidies which reduce the developer's front-end expenditures; expansion 
of sub-regional transit services by the "opt-out" communities from the 
Metropolitan Transit Commission (for example, the community-operated 
Southwest Metro Transit, serving the Eden Prairie, Chanhassen and Chaska 
communities, provides reverse commute services from downtown 
Minneapolis and is currently generating more transit revenue than the 
communities are paying MTC through the property tax}; increased efforts 
to link job opportunities on the fringe with the labor force of inner city 
neighborhoods; desire of the high-tech industries for greater 
environmental quality to fit their workforce preferences. 
RETAIL MARKET 
In contrast, the current retail market appears more resilient. Despite the 
new Mall of America two-thirds of all retail centers reported a vacancy 
rate of less than 10 percent at the end of 19922s. Highest vacancies are in 
the 191 neighborhood centers, particularly in the older ones with poorer 
locations and not anchored by a supermarket. Given the increasing scale of 
supermarket buildings, not many neighborhood centers are in locations to 
attract this volume of business. 
Suburbs in the developing area are still attracting significant growth in 
community-scale shopping centers - particularly those anchored by large 
discount stores or the "power centers" where all tenants are "value 
oriented" outlet-type operations. Renovations in the Fully Developed Area 
or shifting tenant mix away from specialty stores have kept the older 
centers competitive. Retail space is much more closely tied to trade area 
purchasing power as compared with the industrial or office markets, and 
centers left without high density residential and/or affluent households 
in the trade area will lose profitability. 
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DEVELOPERS' PERSPECTIVES 
Discussions with developers lead us to conclude that local real estate 
taxes are not significant in a decision to locate within the metropolitan 
area. The exception may be for downtown Minneapolis where the high local 
taxes plus higher costs of land do make a difference in the final locational 
decision. Land prices on the suburban fringe (including the fast growing 
southwestern suburbs) may be only half those of the fully developed 
communities - all other site factors being equal. Taxation policies at the 
state level were cited as more critical in a decision to move into the Twin 
Cities - not where within the region the company will select to go. 
The clear disadvantage of the central cities for industrial development is 
environmental contamination. Jim Moore at the Minneapolis Community 
Development Agency estimates that the city has spent $20 million over 
the past five years in cleaning up sites, money that otherwise could have 
gone to the Neighborhood Redevelopment Program. Saint Paul is similarly 
constrained by the environmental liability issues associated with 
industrial land development. 
Communities on the developing fringe have been able in the past to use the 
tax increment financing provisions to further enhance their competitive 
advantage in the commercial and industrial marketplace. While 
amendments to the TIF laws have restricted use of TIF on "greenfield 
sites", the FD~ communities are still disadvantaged by relatively higher 
land costs, fewer large sites, fewer amenities surrounding the sites for 
image-conscious corporations, and the ability of developing area 
communities to offer attractive public subsidies. 
Almost all cities are using TIF or some other financial subsidy to attract 
new jobs and generally the urban fringe communities are offering the 
most attractive financial packages. How a community reduces the up-front 
infrastructure improvement costs for developers is significant, but the 
more mature communities are more likely to require the developer to 
assume more of these costs rather than using the community's bonding 
capacity .. Requirements such as floor area ratios, amenity improvements, 
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density controls, etc. are generally seen as consistent across cities and· do 
not push developers away from desirable sites. Most corporations are 
seeking landscape quality specifications in local ordinances. 
Local ordinances defining permitted uses in a zoning district are viewed 
as more important than landscaping, parking or density standards. For 
example, permitting or denying outdoor storage areas in an industrial 
park, or excluding certain commercial uses in an office park have impacts 
on_ where certain types of business can locate or constrain later phases of 
development. It was noted that the Carlson companies in Plymouth are 
currently seeking approval of a WallMart in the office park but that retail 
uses are not permitted under the comprehensive plan or existing zoning. 
Developers are responsive to what the market wants ·and the developing 
communities are well able to satisfy the requirements. A community is 
generally better equipped to cut off development through its land use and 
zoning policies than to create development. The region as a whole is 
better able to "channel development" through regionally controlled 
infrastructure investments. Currently the region does not have policies 
designed to match the economic and social disparities we now find within 
the metropolitan area. 
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CASE STUDIES 
Three case studies describe the process of how private corporations make 
their decision to locate in a specific part of the metropolitan area. The 
first case uses the decision of Health Partners (the parent company for 
Group Health Inc. following its merger with MedCenters 1992) to 
consolidate/relocate its headquarters from the central cities to the 1-494 
strip in Bloomington. The second case examines the decisions of three 
companies to locate in the industrial/business parks in northern Chaska -
a growing suburb in the developing portion of the metropolitan area. The 
third case involves the consolidation/relocation of back-office ·bank 
activities of the First Bank Systems into Energy. Park on a site that had 
been contaminated by prior industrial use. 
The individual case studies describe the circumstances under which the 
location decision was made, the objectives of the corporation, how the 
corporation evaluated options, and how the ·public sector influenced the 
choices considered and finally made by the private business. Each case 
study ends with an overall summary of the factors seen as crucial to the 
final decision and commentary on whether regional/local policies 
impacted the decision. 
HEAL TH PARTNERS 
In 1992 Group Health and MedCenter Health Maintenance Organizations 
(HMOs) merged to create the largest HMO in the state. The merger also 
exacerbated a longer term problem of providing space for a rapidly 
growing administrative and headquarters staff of approximately 1,000 
located in four different buildings. 
The current headquarters at 2829 University Avenue S.E., just east of the 
University East Bank Campus, was purchased by the corporation in 1987 
after leasing the facility for six years. Six years later" the corporation has 
outgrown not only its own building but additional leased space down the 
street in the Court International building. The search for larger space, 
sufficient to accommodate up to 1,500 employees, began in 1991. The 
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search and negotiation process followed two tracks. One pursued the 
option of purchasing an existing building in downtown St. Paul. The other 
searched for leased premises with the assistance of a tenant 
representative firm. Both options were attractive because of high vacancy 
rates in metropolitan office markets in both central city and suburban 
locations. 
The criteria given to its agents in the search provides insight into the 
firm's set of values: 
• Preference for either downtown Minneapolis or St.Paul - given a 
desire to maintain personal connections between the top 
administrative staff and the business community. 
• "Middle quality space" - to avoid potential criticism of high costs 
for administrative and training functions in a high-cost and cost-
conscious industry. 
• Convenience for e,:nployees and sales personnel - in part based on 
ability to have transit- servic:e available and in part based on 
employee attitudes toward alternative locations. 
• Generous, convenient and affordable _parking - governed in part by a 
union contract specifying "free parking" and high parking demand 
generated by the training services for staff from thirty outlying 
clinics. 
• Space sufficient to accommodate 1,500 employees on a longer range 
basis - i.e., net leasable area of 200,000 to 250,000 sq. ft. or a 
building of not less than 300,000 sq. ft. GLA. 
These criteria would appear to favor either of the two central city 
downtowns, especially since a high proportion of employees lived north 
and east of the current facility. The criterion of convenience tended to 
rule out sites south of the Minnesota' River and· in the growing fringe in the 
southwest sector. The criterion of leasing a large ~mount of existing 
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space eliminated the northern suburbs simply because these communities 
did not have available buildings. The parking criterion worked against a 
downtown site. The "middle quality" space criterion should have 
eliminated serious negotiation with Class A space in downtown 
Minneapolis, but in fact it did not because of attractive rent opportunities. 
Several factors, not formally listed, arose during the search. One was the 
design of the building - its efficiency measured in square feet per floor. A 
second factor related to the place of residence of the chief executive 
officer - close to downtown St.Paul - and the perceived contribution that 
Group Health could make to this downtown area which had recently lost 
1,200 employees at West Publishing and had a large amount of vacant 
office space. at the Town Square towers. A third factor related to the sale 
of the current building on University Avenue whose current market value 
was significantly less than the $7.8 million paid for the building in 1981 
and the outstanding $7 million mortgage on the building. 
Underlying all of the above were the economic factors -' annual costs, 
capital costs and financial terms of disposing of the current building on 
University Avenue. 
Serious negotiations occurred for purchasing space in downtown St. Paul, 
focusing on the NCL tower as the preferred choice. 
The leasing option included buildings in downtown Minneapolis, with the 
preferred choice the Class A Lincoln Centre building. Both cities 
aggressively courted the corporation with significant competition 
between the Minneapolis Community Development Agency and St. Paul's 
Planning and Economic Development Department as to which could offer 
the more attractive financial package. Both cities were in a position to be 
the sponsor city for a $50 million tax exempt bond issue that Group Health 
needed for capital expansion. 
Negotiations with St. Paul depended heavily on the availability of 
sufficient square footage for current and future space needs, allocation of 
parking, and costs of parking to employees and disposition of the current 
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building. The City was willing to use a substantial portion of $4.6 million 
in tax increment district funds toward Group Health's purchase of the NCL 
building and offered to subsidize several hundred parking spaces in a new 
parking ramp at 7th and Robert Streets. The City · package included 400 
spaces at $28/month at the new ramp plus 300 spaces in an open lot and 
an option to purchase an interest in the ramp after ten years - a package 
valued at $5.5 million. However, Travellers Insurance held the mortgages 
of both the NCL tower and the Group Health building and no deal could be 
made to get a favorable sale of the University Avenue building. The City 
was not in any position to be the buyer. 
Negotiations with the MCDA and owners of the Lincoln Centre building 
followed a similar path as in St. Paul, wit~ parking availability and costs 
a primary concern. The stumbling block was 'the sale of the existing 
building, plus higher operating costs. 
The Ceridian building at 81 st Street and 34th Avenue in Bloomington 
(former Control Data headquarters, sold in 1985 under a sale leaseback 
arrangement with Ceridian leasing and sub-leasing space) was finally 
chosen by the corporation as the new headquarters when it was clear that 
neither downtown office markets met all criteria. The final agreement 
. involves a lease of 224,000 sq. ft. in a building of 455,000 sq. ft. with a 
future 50,000 sq. ft. being negotiated in 1993 for space in the adjoining 
Atrium Center. Based on current space needs, the downtown locations 
would not have been able to provide sufficient space. The fifteen-year 
lease, with two five-year renewable options includes a mortgage non-
disturbance clause to the leasing terms, allows for further expansion, 
includes use of the site's 1400 parking spaces, plus 40 stalls in a secured 
overnight parking lot and half the garage spaces (55 stalls at additional 
cost). The agreement also includes terms for sharing operating expenses 
for the University Avenue building between Ceridian and the Health 
Partners up to January 1994, with Ceridian marketing the building and 
agreeing to take title themselves if the building is not sold by that time. 
The asking price for the building was set at .$3 million. 
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Assessment of the Factors Affecting the Decision 
The principal stakeholders in this decision included the Health Partners 
Board of Directors, the development agencies of both central cities, the 
owners and mortgage holders of the buildings under consideration, and the 
leasing/marketing agents for these buildings. Current employees and the 
chief executive officer of the corporation should be added to this list 
since their preferences carried significant weight. 
In the final analysis it is apparent that "downtown" is now in a much 
weaker competitive position within a metropolitan office market than it 
was a decade ago. Many office functions (including Health Partners) do not 
require multiple personal interactions among related businesses · to carry 
out their daily activities and the prestige of the location can be a negative 
factor if it appears "luxurious". Convenience for employees to use their 
lunch hour and after work time to shop or for entertainment is less of a 
draw (Ceridian may run a free daily lunch hour shuttle bus to the Mall of 
America to match that convenience). Downto~ns still enjoy the greatest 
accessibility for transit users, but they no longer have the same monopoly 
position. The Mall of America, for example, serves as a minor transit hub 
and MTC is consulting with Health Partners on transit needs of their 
employees for route and schedule improvements. The most serious 
handicap for the downtown office market is viewed by leasing agents as 
the lack of convenient and "free" parking. In part, this drawback is a 
financial one to either the employer or employee, but in part it is the 
perception of inconvenience. Walking three blocks through downtown may 
be less acceptable than walking 900 feet across a large parking lot. 
This last point is an important factor when decision makers are faced 
with suburban location options where all other economic factors on 
capital/operating costs are relatively equal. On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 
meaning the most preferred location, the results of an employees' survey 
returns ranked the airport location as most preferred (2.69). The two · 
central business districts came in below the Ceridan building and had very 
comparable scores (2.97 and 3.01 ). Their least preferred options were 
West Bloomington and the western suburbs (scoring 3.16 and 3.46 
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respectively). It appears that a combination of convenient and no-cost 
parking and minimizing distance travelled were the important criteria for 
employees. 
Central cities are obviously marketing their downtowns aggressively and 
are willing to offer generous subsidies to attract major employers. Tax 
increment resources and willingness to write down parking costs at 
public ramps were offered, but governments do not have the same 
flexibility as the private sector to cover all of the financial concerns ·of 
an individual firm. In this case the loss of market value of the existing 
corporate headquarters building produced a real obstacle. In all likelihood 
it was not the only consideration, but it made a difference in how the 
final decision was made. 
The overall weak office market and resulting rapid decline in the market 
value of existing office space proved to be both an asset and a liability in 
this case study. H offered prospects of getting quality space at relatively 
low cost (either as owned or leased space) but it gave the mortgage 
holders a very significant role in determining the outcome. 
Some of the factors cited in the literature, including locational 
preference of the top management were considered. The CEO's preference 
for downtown St. Paul might have prevailed, all other factors being 
relatively equal. But this is speculative at best. Locational factors (in 
terms of accessibility) were less important ·than the bottoni line, the 
parking and the functionality of space. 
CHASKA INDUSTRIAL PARKS -
Chaska markets itself in the metropolitan area as a "Quality Small Town" 
with a goal of keeping its freestanding center image at the same time as . 
it accommodates significant growth. The city is growing in both 
directions - northward from the early town center along the Minnesota 
River and southward from T.H. 5 and the Jonathon new town. The largest 
industrial area is on the northeast side, part of Jonathon, with an older 
industrial district along the river (see appendix Map). Marketing literature 
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for the Chaska Industrial Parks cites the charm of the small town, the 
progressive business atmosphere and responsive government. .. " ... With 
hundreds of acres of wooded and rolling land designated for industrial -use, 
there is plenty of room for your company to expand". Rolling terrain is not 
often cited as the attraction for industrial users, but this language fits 
the community's mission statement and development costs are less 
significant than the landscape amenity for high-tech industries. 
The City lies in the path of rapid growth in the southwest suburbs and is a 
logical search area as vacant non-residential sites are absorbed into the 
market from Edina, into Eden Prairie and Chanhassen. Upgrading of T.H. 5 
has improved accessibility. Upgrading of T.H. 212 in the south has been 
long promised but not yet realized. 
In 1990 Chaska ranked 20th in the state among the top 25 communities in 
number of manufacturing companies26 (56 firms). Eden Prairie ranked 
fourth with 146 firms. During the 1980s the amount of land used for 
industry more than doubled (from 175 acres to 425 acres) and the city 
projects an additional 300 acres will be taken up during the 1990s. 
Almost no growth occurred during the 1980s in commercial land acreage 
and only 55 acres of commerical development is projected for the 1990s. 
At such time as T.H. 212 is upgraded through the City a large vacant area 
in the township will become ripe for development and the comprehensive 
plan identifies a new large industrial area in the extreme southeast 
sector of the city (see appendix Map). The city does not enjoy similar 
locational ·advantages for retail or office space - it is still too far out on 
the fringe. 
Jonathon Industrial Parks 
The 1985 Redevelopment and Tax Increment Financing district approved by 
the City provided the financial resources to install necessary public 
infrastructure within the Jonathon Industrial Park, Crosby Industrial Park, 
Jonathon Industrial Park North and the quality of the industrial area 
adjacent to American Crystal along the Minnesota River. The use of tax 
increment financing is widespread throughout the ~nveloping suburban 
5 1 
communities, but there are some features unique to the Chaska project -
designation relied on the blighting impact of flood hazards for the entire· 
lower part of the City with the Army Corp of Engineers estimating project 
costs at $30 million for flood control. The City's share was between $6 
and $9 million of that amount. The flood control project provided the 
opportunity to include the northern industrial park areas within the 
district and still have 70% of parcels considered "blighted".- i.e. subject 
to flood hazards. The City was thus able to create a TIF district with non-
contiguous parcels within a larger redevelopment district that included 
both older industrial areas and "greenfield" sites which needed major 
public improvements to market the land (see appendix Map). 
Public infrastructure improvements for sewer, storm sewer, water and 
road improvements were all needed for the Jonathon industrial areas. Tax 
incre1:1ent financing has been the key tool for attracting significant 
new indusfrial development in recent years and meeting the 
community's following goals27: 
• Increase the pace of industrial development that would not normally 
occur. 
• Ensure high quality development. 
• Build ·a healthy industrial tax base. 
• Increase demand for Chaska's Utility Division (electric and water) to 
supplement the general fund and thus stabilize property taxes. 
• Enhance the City's sense of community by creating a strong and 
diversified job base in the industrial sector. 
TIF can be applied toward land write-down, water and sewer connection 
charges, building permit fees and special assessments. In practice, the 
land write-down provision has been used in most instances. 
Conditions for receiving TIF include: an executed contract with the owner 
that provides for a letter of credit in favor of the EDA· for any and all up-
front payments made utilizing TIF; a minimum market value in a 
recordable Assessment Agreement and minimum tax increment guarantee; 
a minimum tax guarantee until the City/EDA has paid in full any bonds 
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associated with the upfront tax increment payment. The "pay-as-you-go" 
method of receiving tax increment requires no letter of credit or tax 
increment guarantee. 
A company acquiring sufficient land to permit at least 50 percent 
expansion of the building at a future date becomes eligible for a subsidy 
equivalent to the first three years of tax increment created by the 
investment. That is, the City will write-down costs up to the amount of 
three years of the additional property taxes generated by the development. 
A maximum subsidy of the equivalent of two years of the increment is 
allowed if no expansion space is provided. 
Following is a brief description of how three firms have taken advantage 
of the City's policies, described above, since 1990. 
LEWIS ENGINEERING 
This is a privately-owned company manufacturing steel products for 
bridges and is considered "heavy industry". It requires outdoor storage 
space and was previously located in Edina at 50th street and T.H. 100 -
one of a small group of industries next to Jerry's Foods. The company had 
outgrown its 25,000 sq. ft. building, and its location in Edina was not an 
appropriate site for this type of operation. 
· The search for a new facility was limited by the following factors: desire 
to remain in the western suburban area, need for an industrial area where 
outdoor storage was permitted, cost of land, and ability to use a 
community's TIF subsidies. Chaska fit the bill on all counts. The 
company's employees are primarily skilled welders and machinists and 
live throughout the metropolitan area with no special concentration in any 
sector. Employee resistance to the move was thus minimal; the firm's 
owner's familiarity with the area and residence in th~ southwest suburbs 
made the Chaska location personally convenient. 
The company purchased 12 acres at $25,000 an ~ere and built a 100,000 
sq. ft. building to suit its operations. It brought between 50 and 60 new 
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employees to the City. The City gave the company a three-year write-
down on the land equivalent to the first three years of tax increment. 
LIFECORE BIOMEDICAL 
This is a publicly-held corporation with highly specialized manufacturing 
processes that require special piping and also a stable supply of pure 
water. The company manufactures sterile medical devices and employs 
scientists, engineers and highly skilled craftspeople. The company 
previously occupied leased premises close to the University of Minnesota 
in Minneapolis adjacent to Williams Arena. The premises covered half a 
city block and when the company outgrew this space it leased additional 
space at Hennepin and 135W in Minneapolis. Prior to the move to Chaska in 
1991 it employed 50 persons. A survey of place of residence of employees 
showed a very dispersed pattern - from North Minneapolis to St. Paul and 
many southern suburbs. 
The search for new premises was controlled by the following factors: a 
site and building large enough to permit strong future growth at the one 
location; a new building, since retrofitting to meet the specifications for 
the manufacturing process would be very expensive; high quality water 
supplies (consistent temperature and consistent quality - a feature not 
available through the Minneapolis municipal water system); convenience 
for top management (living in western suburbs); financial assistance from 
the local community. 
The company was able to . satisfy all these condition in the Jonathon 
Industrial Park. A 33-acre site was purchased and a 65,000 sq. ft. building 
was built using Industrial Revenue Bonds floated by the City. Land costs 
were written down through a three-year tax increment subsidy. Water for 
the operations is drawn from the aquifer (not municipal supplies) and the 
company has an agreement with the City to discharge its treated waste 
water (of very high quality) into a small adjacent lake. 
The company provided financial incentives to employees if they agreed to , 
remain with the corporation following the move. These included stock. 
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options (up to 1000 shares valued at $3-4 dollars a share phased in over 
the years) and a travel allowance added to the salary to cover any 
additional personal travel costs. The company now employs 108 perso~s 
and few of the initial employees left the corporation for other 
employment. 
The company is well satisfied with its decision. It has an efficient 
building in a high amenity location adjacent to the Minnesota Arboretum. 
The water discharge agreement with the City eliminates what would have 
been high sewer charges. The City's financial assistance made it a cost 
effective move. Perhaps the only economic drawback is the higher cost of 
electricity from the Chaska Utility - considerably higher than from NSP. 
JAMCO INTERNATIONAL 
The firm started in 1980 in the owner's basement and has had several 
locations following changes in his residence. Just prior to the move to 
Chaska, the firm was located in Eden Prairie occupying 12,000 sq.ft. of 
leased office warehouse space. The company is in the promotional 
products business. It has a "Recognition Division" that manufactures, 
assembles or packages corporate promotional materials; it has a "School 
Products Division" providing similar products for school promotions: it 
has a "Fulfillment Services Division" which distributes the products 
offered by corporations through coupon clipping, etc. 
As the company outgrew its Eden Prairie space, the owner constrained his 
search for a new location by the following factors: only southwestern 
suburbs considered because of convenience to owner and growth potential 
in this sector; favorable economic terms for acquiring land and building; 
convenience to the airport in Bloomington and the Flying Cloud airport for 
private jets of customers and use by the sales force; quality image of the 
site (the firm is in the "image business"). 
A realtor was used to examine opportunities although the owner was 
· familiar with the Chaska area. In late 1991 the company purchased a site 
of between six and seven acres with a view over the Hazeltine golf course; 
55 
the company qualified for the land write~down, equivalent to three years 
tax increment. Land was priced at $40,000 an acre with an additional 
$65,000 per acre special assessments for infrastructure improvements. A 
56,000 sq.ft. building was financed through the SBA. The firm size is just 
over 30 persons. The owner cited the amenity of the golf course and 
adjacent lake, the IDS training center, and the University of St. Thomas as 
contributing to a high quality environment for the operation. 
Assessment of the Factors Affecting Location 
A combination of factors combine to make urban fringe industrial ·land 
' development highly marketable, particularly in the southwest sector of 
the metropolitan area. Highway accessibility is good and constantly being 
improved, these suburbs have well above average household incomes and 
are "home" to many commercial and industrial executives. Dayton Hudson 
Corporation's selection of Southdale as the pioneer location for the first 
regional shopping center in the region gave a strong signal of how 
competitive this sector is within the metropolitan market for all types of 
land use. 
A community . such as Chaska benefits from its location in the path of high 
growth and from early land use planning and public sector support of 
industry to sustain a relatively self-contained community. While Jonathon 
as a "new town" failed to meet its early promise, that planning set aside 
large industrial park areas in the northern sections and the land was 
marketed as part of the T.H. 5 corridor development. Jonathon was more 
successful in its attraction of jobs than in its residential villages and 
small scale commercial development. Industrial jobs are more readily 
dispersed geographically than are retail or office commercial. Employees 
can pretty much live anywhere in the metropolitan area without exceeding 
a 30-minute commute. Industry does not have to rely on the purchasing 
power of the immediate trade area as does retail. 
Industrial development needs good highway access, centralized sewer and 
water services, low land costs, location in the path of growth, and a 
receptive city willing to use public subsidies to attract jobs. The 
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reputation of the community as a good place to live, particularly for those 
making investment decisions, is a further competitive advantage. Fringe 
areas do not have to contend with the problems of polluted sites (at least 
not as a rule), large sites are available for businesses seeking to expand 
and they usually have the further advantage of using TIF to reduce the 
front-end development costs (both public infrastructure and private land 
acquisition). U is therefore not surprising that industrial job growth is 
still moving out from the· core. 
ENERGY PARK AND FIRST BANK 
The development of Energy Park was a very atypical inrter city 
redevelopment project. First, it encompassed an exceptionally large site -
21 8 acres of under-developed land sandwiched between two major rail 
lines in St. Paul's Midway District. Second, it included 36 acres with 
extensive soil contamination at the former Koppers Coke site. Third, it 
was redeveloped as part of an experiment ·in fast-tracking public 
approvals under the Negotiated Investment Strategy and had a mixture of 
uses - industrial, business office park uses, specialized "festival market" 
retail, and high density townhousing and apartments. Within Energy Park, 
the ET A property (ETA was a computer hardware subsidiary of Control 
Data Corporation) was selected as a case study because its site was part 
of the Koppers Coke property and illustrates the special difficulties faced 
by inner cities in re-marketing environmentally polluted land. (see 
appendix Map of Energy Park) 
Ironically, Koppers Coke was shut down in 1978 by the Environmental 
Protection Agency for reasons of severe air pollution but land and ground 
water pollution problems have since created marketing difficulties. Soil 
remediation was required under the Pollution Control Agency rules when 
carcinogenic materials were found on the site. Some of these materials 
had percolated into a perched water table, although the underlying aquifer 
was not at risk. The property is one of the Superfund listed sites and 
financial assistance was used to remove contaminated soil. This was· 
completed by 1984. The ground water problems, however, were not 
resolved. 
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The 36-acre site had been initially purchased by the St. Paul Port 
Authority in its role as developer for the entire Energy Park and 24 acres 
sold to Control Data Corporation for one dollar for its new ETA facility in 
1984. CDC was indemnified by the Port Authority from environmental 
liability. ETA's building of 120,000 sq. ft. was specially designed for 
computer operations. Tax exempt bonds were issued by the Port Authority 
to finance the building. 
Five years later ETA went out of business. CDC paid off the building debt. 
CDC believed it had reached an agreement in Fall _of 1989 to sell the 
building to 3M as a research facility for $5.6 million dollars (below initial 
costs) and the City was ready to give 3M the same indemnity for 
environmental liability. For multiple reasons; not only the liability 
concerns, the sale did not go through. 
In 1990 First Bank Systems began its search for new •back office" 
functions and reached agreement with Ryan Construction Company for the 
company to find/build a facility for the bank to lease. The bank's 
operations required a more efficient •horizontal" building layout than the 
existing downtown St. Paul bank building. The ETA building and the 
Johnson building along T.H. 55 in Golden Valley were final contenders, 
with the Energy Park location finally selected. The success in putting 
together this project won the National Association of Industrial and 
Office Parks (NAIOP) 1992 award as the "Most Creative Transaction" for 
1992! (See appendix for summary of the project prepared for the award 
ceremony). 
It is instructive to note the complexity of marketing a formerly polluted 
site. Koppers' parent company had operations on 50 polluted sites across 
the U.S., and its products had been traced to a 100 different landfills. The 
$57 million corporate reserve for losses from pollution clean-up 
activities could be readily exhausted. Sun America Insurance Company (Los 
Angeles), however, had previously closed on two other Koppers sites and 
was willing to take the risk of a $34.5 million mortgage. 
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The public interest involved in the transaction was also a significant 
factor. The Port Authority had to realign a chain of users within its TIF 
district in order to sell $3.5 million of new bonds and gain support from. 
its Board (in fact $1 O million of bonds had to be issued in order to place 
the project second in line as a creditor). The Board had several concerns: 
the overall financial viability of the Energy Park TIF district; the ability 
to realign creditors; the inability to use the "pay-as-you-go" TIF financing 
because of up-front cash needs to satisfy the loan-to-value criterion; and 
concerns over the potential loss of a large number of jobs from St. Paul if 
the Bank moved its operations to Golden Valley. The Board and City Council 
also needed confirmation that "but for" this financial assistance the 
project would not go forward in St. Paul. 
The public interest was guaranteed by clauses in the final agreement with 
. Ryan: developer to contribute $2.4 million to the project prior to any 
commitment of TIF funds; that if at any time less than 680 employees are 
employed at the site for more than 180 days in a twelve month period, the 
developer will make principal and interest payments due on the bonds 
during the period of the employee shortfall; that the minimum market 
value of the property as of January 2, 1992 shall be no less than $6.75 
million dollars and as of January 2, 1993 and thereafter, shall be no less 
than $13.5 million. The developer also was required to guarantee at least 
$789,602 of tax payments annually from 1994 to 2007 (the maturity date 
of the bonds). Note that this was a $40 million project. 
Assessment of the Factors Affecting the Location Decision 
The NAIOP words of "most creative transaction" are very appropriate. The 
project needed the public sector to provide financial subsidies to the 
developer - using the state enabling TIF legislation and a public purpose 
development agency with skilled staff to negotiate. The threat of losing a 
significant number of employees from the City and reducing the financial 
strength of the Energy Park TIF district were powerful motivations for 
the public sector to take a very proactive role in negotiating a sale to 
Ryan. 
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The transaction could not have been consummated if the City/Port · 
Authority had not been able to satisfy the lender on environmental 
liability by the Port Authority indemnifying Ryan (plus Koppers indemnity 
on the ground water issue) and by the City creating a special Hazardous 
Substance Sub-District to TIF which allows the city's full tax base to be 
used in the event of a future incident. 
The developer's risk (in this case Ryan, and not First Bank System) 
obviously had to be matched with potential financial gain and perhaps here 
the unique qualities of the ETA building played a significant role. The 
building was single story and designed with some redundancy in its 
mechanical and electrical systems and thus it fit well with the special 
needs of the bank's operations and the check-clearing activities. Utility to 
this specific user exceeded the building's market value but a large 
additional investment was made to install major redundancy for their 
communications/computer operations. Approximately half of the total 
investment was to insure full reliability of their on-line communications. 
The legal frameworks at national, state and local levels covering 
environmental risk are critical factors when marketing any Superfund 
site. In this instance, the other factors made it possible to address the 
legal issues and create an acceptable level of risk to all parties.· 
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LESSONS LEARNED 
1 . The challenge is not to constrain development in the developing area 
but to allocate resources to cope with the process of aging, changing 
technologies (and thus shifting relative locational advantage) and 
recycling the built environment. 
It is clearly not a level playing field for the inner cities and an increasing 
number of fully developed suburbs in the competition for new commercial 
and industrial development. The older communities have multiple 
handicaps: lack of large sites; contaminated sites; obsolete structures; 
declining property values in an over-built market; stabilization or loss of 
market share of the region's purchasing power. Existing tools of tax 
increment financing are available to the developing communities, as they 
are to the older ones. TIF alone is not sufficient to match the higher costs 
of developing in the FDA. 
2. The political fragmentation of the region and increasing reliance on the 
local property tax to finance services contribute to the problems of the 
FDA. 
The sharing of commercial/industrial tax base within the region js a very 
positive step toward equalizing resources, but it is clearly inadequate to 
counterbalance the ever present advantages of urban fringe sites in a 
region well provided with highways, sewers and natural amenities. 
3. Over-building of the office and spec light industrial buildings gives the 
region a breathing space to consider new policies to assist 
reinvestments in the Fully Developed Area. 
Built-to-suit projects are still strong pieces of the market, but the 
projected absorption pace of new space is generally low. Many buildings 
have values well below cost, and outstanding debt, . and thus offer more 
attractive opportunities than building new. Existing projects within the 
FDA will thus be attractive options for buyers. 
6 1 
4. Lending institutions and place of residence of persons making 
locational decisions are key factors. 
Underwriting standards and risk avoidance of lenders make investments in 
fringe locations more attractive. The FDA thus has to rely more heavily on 
their economic development agencies and public sector financing. Most of 
the metropolitan communities have become sophisticated in their ability 
to use their public powers to develop and redevelop sites. 
Where business owners live is an important factor in selecting a location 
for a new or growing firm. In part, this is because the owner is more 
familiar with the sector and thus searches more narrowly than the full 
metropolitan area; in part it is image and lower travel times. 
5. The image value of central business districts is becoming less with the 
gro'l(fh of service industries, new communication technologies and high 
tech industries. 
The need for and the prestige of a downtown location is still important, 
but for fewer firms. A downtown location must therefore have 
economic/cost advantages to a higher degree than would have been the 
case in the 1960s and 1970s when many downtown blocks were 
redeveloped. , More and more locational choices are available to both retail, 
office and light industry. 
6. Decision· makers are placing greater emphasis on convenience in terms 
of parking and cost of parking - a convenience that cannot be matched 
by downtown locations or older industrial and retail districts. 
In a highly mobile society and in a region with relatively short commuting 
times to multiple employment sites, both corporate executives and 
employees want on-site parking which is viewed as "free". Parking costs 
.. 
are significant costs to lower paid workers and decentralized transit 
service to employment centers outside of the two central cities has 
already opened up more opp.ortunities for transit-dependent workers to 
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work in suburban locations. Expanded transit service to the fringe 
locations is expected in the future. 
7. Where the region places and how it prices its infrastructure will have a 
significant impact on the market. 
Not withstanding developers' statements that cities generally can't 
"create" a market, the region as a whole can affect the relative attraction 
of locations for new commercial and industrial investments through its 
infrastructure policies. These investments and programs/funds ~o 
facilitate recycling of our older commercial districts are levers to 
manipulate the market. 
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MOST CREATIVE TRANSACTION 
1992 
Submitted by: 
RYAN CONS'fRUCTION COMPANY OF MINNESOTA, INC. 
This transaction successfully overcame many obstacles to achieve a project difficult in today's 
market. The transaction included the cooperation of numerous parties and involved the sale of 
building and land, a lease, 120,CXXJ square foot building renovation, 260,000 square foot new 
construction, and complex financing to create a technologically advanced facility for the user. 
OWNER/DEVELOPER: 
CONTRACTOR: 
LOCATION: 
SET I ERS: 
TOT AL PROJECT COST: 
START DATE: 
COMPLETION DA TE: 
ARCHITECT: 
STRUCTURAL ENGINEER: 
MECHANICAL ENGINEER: 
LANDSCAPE DESIGNER: 
FINANCING/EQUITY: 
Ryan Proprnies, Inc. 
Ryan Construction Company of Minnesota, Inc. 
1200 Energy Park Drive 
St. Paul, Minnesota 
Control Data Corporation 
· SL Paul Port Authority 
$40 million 
August, 1990 
December, 1992 
Symmes, Maini & McKee Associates 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 
Symmes, Maini & McKee Associates 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 
Michaud, Cooley, Erickson &. Associates, Inc. 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 
Westwood Professional Services 
Eden Prairie, Minnesota 
SunAmerica - Permanent 
Ryan Construction - Equity 
Pon Authority/City .;f Saint Paul - T .l.F. 
7 1 
POSITIVE OUTCOMES 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Completion of a successful hi-tech facility for the user which will substantially reduce 
operating costs and increase operating efficiency. 
Obtained financing in today's distressed lending market. 
Redeveloped a vacant building site by tripling the size. 
Utilized and created value on an existing superfund site. 
CHALLENGFS/QBSTACLES 
1. Financing in Existing Lending Market 
2. Financing for a Supcrfund Site 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Solved by: Ryan's expertise and relationships 'With lenders. 
Tax Increment Financing (need to refinance tax increment district as well 
as tax increment bond sale to provide project funds) 
Owner :Equity 
Hazardous Substance Subdistrict 
Environmental Issues 
Solved by: Indemnity Agreements 
Hazardous Substance Subdistrict 
Regulatory Cooperation 
Construction Challenges 
Mechanical & Electrical Desi~; Solved by close integration of the project's existing 
systems with new state-of-the-an mechanical and electrical installations. 
Schedule; Ryan guaranteed a 13 month schedule and reached substantial completion in 
11 1/2 months! 
Architecrural; The integration of efficient and cost-effective building components and 
the design of highly functional interior space that met the diversified needs of First Bank 
Systems. 
Future Expansion Needs 
Option P10pcrry - Adjacent to Site 
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6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Compliance with Protective Land Coven.ants 
Development/Construction Team 
Community Cooperation 
Landscaping 
Management of process and large number of parties involved in transaction. 
Development Agreement 
Ryan Parmership Creation 
Ryan bought in an equity partner to fund equity. 
10. (Operational) Ten.ant Transportation Issues 
PARTICIPANTS 
Task force created to work with MTC to design and implement a new bus 
route. 
Ryan Construction-First Bank Systems-SL Paul Pon Authority-City of Saint Paul-Eberbardt-
CB Commercial-Legal-Regulatory 
73 
PROJECT NARRATIVE 
The First Bank Systems Data Operations Center project began in 1990 when the site search 
began for an approximate 360,000 square foot facility. This $40 million dollar project 
proceeded in Energy Park in Saint Paul on the former vacant ETA site. This site contained 24 
acres and an existing 120,000 square foot building. The project was already a designated 
superfund site which was to greatly affect the ability to finance the project over the next couple 
of years. 
A team of participants lead by Ryan allowed this project to go forward. The team included 
Ryan, First Bank Systems, the St. Paul Pon Authority, Eberhardt, City of St. Paul, CB 
Commercial and Control Data Corporation as well as the various attorneys representing the 
panics already mentioned. 
The environmental nature of the site necessitated a great deal of creativity and hard work to 
bring this project to completion. Many lenders and lending sources were sought over this time 
period. The final solution was found by the provision of a number of layers of indemnities, a 
creation of a hazardous substance subdistrict, and the commitment of a lender which had 
previously made loans on simiJar superfund sites (on which the original responsible party had 
operated). 
The hazardous substance. subdistrict, the first ever created in the City of Saint Paul. was 
approved by the City, County and School District and allowed the •base• of the Energy Park 
tax increment district to be captUTCd from the site and adjacent properties to be used as dollars 
towards any necessary clean-up or testing that may be necessary in the future. 
The Pon Authority and the City of Saint Paul also provided approximately S3.S million of tax 
increment financing based upon.the substantial number of quality jobs at this site (1,200). 
Additionally, an option on an adjacent 4 acre site owned by the Pon Authority was negotiated 
to facilitate a future expansion. 
This large team of people worked coopeiarively for 2 1/2 years to bring this exciting project to 
completion. The completed project in December, 1992 brought into existence one of the most 
highly technological bank data operation centers in the country. 
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Listed below is the team and their respective roles: 
Ryan Construction Pat Ryan 
First Bank Systems Gary Watne 
Eberhardt Bob Schoening 
Symmes, Maini & McKee 
St. Paul Pon Authority Julie Kimble 
City of Saint Paul Katie Lindblad 
Control Data Corporation Greg Lokken 
Gary Beusgcns 
CB Commercial John Allen 
Law Firms: Leonard, Street & Dcinard 
Dorsey & Whitney 
Briggs & Morgan 
Maun & Simon 
Doheny, Rumble & Butler 
Developer, Owner 
FBS Representative 
Tenant Representative to FBS 
Architect & Engineer 
Tax Increment Financing, Haz.ardous 
Substance Subdistrict. Land Option, 
Facility Sale 
Tax Increment Financing and 
Haz.ardous Substance Subdistrict 
Seller 
Broker for Control Data Corp. 
Regulatory: Minnesota Pollution Control Agency 
75 
Corps of Engineers St. Paul District 
WETLAND TYPES REGULATED BY 
FEDERAL/STATE/LOCAL PROGRAMS 
WETLAND TYPE FEDERAL STATE Mill 
Type 1 - Floodplain Forest and F IP L 
Seasonally-flooded Basin F IP L• 
Type 2 • Wet meadow or prairie F IP L .. 
Type 3 • Shallow Marsh F DIP L••• 
Type 4 • Deep Marsh F DIP L••• 
Type 5 • Open Water (Pond) F DIP L••• 
Type 6 • Scrub Shrub Swamp F IP L 
Type 7 • Wooded Swamp F IP L 
Type 8 • Bog F IP L 
F = U.S. Army Corps of Engineers regulatory program 
0 = Minnesota Department of Natural Resources protected waters program; MONR authority Is 
limited to those wetlands that exceed 1 O acres In size In unincorporated areas and 2.5 
acres In Incorporated areu - protected weUanda are Hated on the Protected Waters 
Inventory Map 
P = Minnesota Pollutlon Control Agency authority; MPCA utilizes the Corps Section 404 Clean 
Water Act program to review and certtty that projects meet Section 401 state water quality 
standards, but tt la recommended that MPCA be contacted to determine the appllcablllty 
of tta other regulatory authorttJes, e.g., Section 402. 
L = Local Government Untta responalble for Implementation of the Minnesota Wetlands 
Conservation Act of 1991 (WCA). The Minnesota Board of Water and Soll Resources has 
overall reaponalblllty for direction of this program, and MONR hu enforcement 
reaponalbllles. 
L• = Seasonally.flooded Baalna located In •agricultural areu• are exempt from WCA regulation 
L•• = WCA regulates only those Type 2 wetlands that are greater than 2 acres In alze and are 
not In agricultural use. Mitigation through replacement la required for the destruction of 
these wetlands. 
L••• = LGU'a regulate those Type 3,4,and 5 wetlands that are below the alze threshhold 
regulated by the MONR, or which are not on the Protectec;f Waters Inventory Map. 
76 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
FEDERAL WETLAND JURISDICTION : 
SEQUENCE OF ANALYSIS 
. IS THE ARE.~ A WATE~ OF THE U.S.? 
. WILL THE PROJECT INVOLVE A DISCHARGE OF 
DREDGED OR FILL MATERIAL INTO THE . 
WATERBODY? 
IF THE ANSWER TO El!HER OF THE ABOVE QUESTIONS IS "~O." 11IEN NO 
PER.\IIT OR NOTICE TO TliE CORPS IS REQUIRED 
. DOES THEDISCHARGE COME WITHIN ONE. OF THE. 
SIX CLEAN WATER. ACT E<Elv1PTIONS? 
ti 'IH£ANSWER.'TO 'I"HEABovr:·QUESTioN rs "YES;" '!HEN NhPERMiT-oR 
NOTICE TO THE·coRPS. IS REQUIRED 
IS THE ACTIVITY OR ARE<\ AUTHORIZE:J BY A 
NATIONWIDE PE.9MIT? 
IF THE ANSWER TO THE ABOVE QUESl'ION IS "NO.■ YOU MUST CONTINUE THE 
SEQUENCE. IFTHEANSWER IS "YES," YOUR PROJECT_IS J.IKEIYAUTHOlUZFD 
BUTYOU MAYOR MAYNOT]JE REQUIRED TO PROVIDEADVANCE NOTICE TO 
THE CORPS. NOTmCATI0N REQUIREMENTS ARE STATED L'l SPECIFIC 
NATIO~E PERMITS. 
. HAS THE ACTIVITY BE:N APPROVED BY THE 'NDNR 
AND THERE:Y AUTHORIZED BY A REGiONAL 
GE:·JERAL PE~MIT? 
IF THE ANSWER TO THE AVOVE QUESTION IS "YES' THE PROJECT IS 
AUTHORIZED. Btrr ~OTICE Mt:ST BE PROVIDED TO THE CORPS. IF THE 7 7 
.~'lSV.'"Eil IS "NO; THEN YOU IBJST APPLY FOR A.'l INDIVIDUALPE:L'1IT AND 
Variable: Type, Description 
MCD_NAME: Character, same as ANPSADPI 
CITY_OR_TOWN: Character, •DERIVED, tnmcates 
ANPSADPI to name reference e.g. 
ANDOVER CITY= CITY 
OOC_ID: Character, DERIVED, tnmcates ANPSADPI 
to common name reference e.g. ANDOVER 
CITY= ANDOVER 
COUNTY: Character, name of county e.g. ANOKA 
FIPS_CODE: Number, 8 digit rcfezcnc.e includes stale, 
county, MCD identifim e.g. ANDOVER 
CITY = 27003004 
FIPS_COMCD: Number, 6 digit rcfercnc.e county and MCD 
e.g. ANDOVER CITY= 003004 
FIPS_CO: Number, 3 digit reference to county e.g. 
ANOKA=003 
FIPS_MCD: Number, 3 digit reference to MCD e.g. 
ANDOVER CITY= 004 
FIPS_PL: Number.S digit reference, FIPS Place code 
e.g. A'.NDOVER CITY= 01486 
DEPT_REV: Number, DERIVED, 6 digit reference used 
by MN Dept of Revenue to identify place 
e.g. ANDOVER CITY= 020300 
GROW _AREA: Character, DERIVED, Planning areas i.e. 
Core, Developed. Developing, Rural; not for 
use in time series studies 
TIME_RINGS: Character, D~ Planning are.as Le. 
Core, Fully Developed, Developing, and 
Rural; used for time series studies 
RINGS: Number, integer value for TIME_RINGS 
SECTOR: Number, DERIVED.Planning areas, 8 
sectors in all which in general break 
QUADRANTs in half 
QUADRANT: Character, DERIVED.Planning areas metro 
quads e.g. NW, SW, SE, NE 
PLAN_AREA: Number, DERIVED,2 digit reference to 
Planning areas 10 thru 14 e.g. FUll Y 
DEVELOPED= 10 
GROW _SECTR.: Number, DERIVED, l digit reference to 
PLAN_AREA regrouping e.g. 
PLAN AREA (11,14) = GROW SECTR (5) 
GROW _SECNAME: Character, DERIVEDCharacter reference to 
GROW _SECTR, e.g. GROW _SECIR (5) = 
Rural Centers --
Original Source of Data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE, 
Local Government Services Division 
METROPOLITAN COUNCil. 
METROPOLITAN COUNCil., 
METROPOLITAN COUNCil.. 
METROPOLITAN COUNCil.. 
METRO POLIT AN COUNCil.. 
METROPOLITAN COUNCil. 
METROPOLITAN COUNCil.. 
METROPOLITAN COUNCil.. 
• DERIVED indicates thaI the original data was manipulated or needed to be data entered, i.e. it did not come in a machine readable 
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Variable : Type, Description 
AV All._SQMI: Number, DERIVED, Total MCD acres less 
MCD aacs of water/ 640 aacs to conven to 
SQ MI, data from a preliminary land use 
TOT AL_SQMI: Number, DERIVED, Total MCD acres/ 640 
aaes to convcn to SQ MI, data from a 
preliminary land use report 
TOTAL_ACRES: Number, DERIVED, Total MCD acres, data 
from a preliminary land use report 
FIPS_PLACE: Character, FIPS_PLACE code as a character 
rather than a numeric value 
ANPSADPI: Character, MCD character name 
POP80: Number, Population 1980 
POP90: Number, Population 1990 · 
FAM90: Number, ofFamilies 1990 
HU90: Number, of Housing tmits 1990 
URB90: Number, Population in urbanized areas 
NONURB90: Number, Population in non-urbanized areas 
RFARM90: Number, Rural/farm population 
RNFARM90: Number.Rural/non-farm population 
MAI.E90: Number, of Males 
FEM90: Number, of Females 
WHITE90: Number, of Whites 
BLACK90: Number, of Blacks 
AMIND90: Number, of American Indians 
ASIAN90: Number, of Asians 
OTHER90: Number, of Other races 
· I-IlSP90: Number, of Hispanic 
AGE..T5: Number, Age< 5 
.AGE517: Number, Arze 5 - 17 
AGE1821: Number, Age 18 • 21 
AGE2224: Number, Age 22 • 2A 
AGE2529: Number, Age 25 - 29 
AGE3034: Number, Age 30 • 34 
AGE3539: Number.Age 35 -39 
AGE4044: Number, Age 40 - 44 
AGE4549: Number, Age 45 -49 
AGES054: Number. Age 50 - 54 
AGES559: Number, Age 55 - 59 
AGE.6061: Number. Age 60- 61 
AGE6264: Number, Age 62 - 64 
AGE6S69: Number. Age 65 - 69 
AGE7074: Number, Age 70-74 
AGE7579: Number, Age 75 - 79 
AGE8084: Number. Age 80 - 84 
AGEGT85: Number, Age > 85 
79 
Original Source of Data 
METROPOLITAN COUNCil. 
METROPOLITAN COUNCil. 
METROPOLITAN COUNCil. 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
1990 CENSUS data 
Variable: Type, Description 
92NEW _PER: Number, DERIVED, number of permits for 
NEW c:onstrUCtion from December list FY 
1992, year-to-date with imputations for items 
318-329 
92NEW _VALUE: Number, DERIVED, asses.wr's estirnsted 
market value of NEW construction from 
December list FY 1992, year-to-date with 
imputations for items 318-329 
92ADD_PER.: Number, DERIVED, number of permits for 
ADDmON c:onsttuction from December list 
FY 1992. year-to-date with imputations for 
item 417 
92ADD_ VALUE: Number, DERIVED, assessor's estimated 
market value of ADDmON consttUCtion 
from December list FY 1992, year-to-date 
with imputations for item 417 
90NEW _PER: Number, DERIVED, number of permits for 
NEW conmuction from December list FY 
1990, year-to-date with imputations for items 
318-329 
90NEW _VALUE: Number, DERIVED, assessor's estinwed 
market value of NEW construction from 
December list FY 1990, year-to-date with 
imputations for items 318-329 
90ADD_PER: Number, DERIVED, nwnbe:r of permits for 
ADDmON construction from December list 
FY 1990, year-to-date with imputations for 
item 417 , 
90ADD_ VALUE: Number, DERIVED, assessor's estimated 
market value of ADDmON construction 
from December list FY 1990, year-to-date 
with imputations for item 417 
COMMER.CIAL80: Number, DERIVED, Total MCD 
Commercial acres 1980, data from a 
preliminary land use report 
INDUSTRIAL80: Number, DERIVED, Total MCD Industrial 
acres 1980, data from a preliminary land usc 
COMMER.CI.AL90: Number, DERIVED, Total MCD 
Commercial aacs 1990, dara from a 
preliminary land use report 
INDUSTRIAL90: Number, DERIVED, Total MCD Industrial 
acres 1990, data from a preliminary land usc 
EMPLOY80: Number, DERIVED, T AZ employment 
summed by MCD 1980 
EMPLOY90: Number, DERIVED, TAZ employment 
summed by ML:D 1990 
EMP _DIFF: Number, EMPLOY90 1c.ss EMPLOY80 
80 
Original Source of Data 
METROPOLITAN COUNCil. 
METROPOLITAN COUNCil. 
METROPOLITAN COUNCil. 
METROPOLITAN COUNCil. 
METROPOLITAN COUNCil.. 
METROPOLITAN COUNCil.. 
METROPOLITAN COUNCil. 
METROPOLITAN COUNCil. 
METROPOLITAN COUNCil. 
METROPOLITAN COUNCil. 
METROPOLirAN COUNCll.. 
METROPOLITAN COUNCIL 
METROPOLITAN COUNCIL 
METROPOLITAN COUNCil. 
M..I'ROPOLITAN COUNCil. 
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Variable: Type, Description 
DIFF/EMPSO: Number, EMP _DIFF / EMPLOY80 % 
change from 1980 level 
CERCUS: Number, DERIVED, of CERCUS 
(Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Comemation, and Uability Information 
System) sites per MCD 
NLP: Number, DERIVED, of NPL (National 
Priorty List) sites per MCD, federal 
Superfund 
PLP: Number, DERIVED, PLP (Pennament List 
of Priorties) sites per MCD, state Superfund 
HW _PER: Number, DERIVED, of Hazanious wmic siic 
permits, does not imply current 
contamination 
HW _ENF: Number, DERIVED, Some past enforcement 
action at the hazardous waste site , does not 
imply cum:nt problems or contamination 
SW _PER: Number, DERIVED, of Solid waste site 
permits, does DOl imply current 
contamination 
METRO_ODI: Number, DERIVED, a site where 
uncontrolled disposal has taken place in the 
past. Many areformer open dump sites 
posing insiimifiC3Jlt contamination problems 
PTI: Number, DERIVED, a site that is being 
voluntarily investigated or cleaned up by a 
buyer, seller, or other party interested in 
developing the proprty. 
ENVIR_SUM: Number, DERIVED, Sum of CERCUS, 
NPL, PLP, HW _PER. HW _ENF, SW _PER. 
METRO ODI, and PTI 
SITE_ !OT AL: Number, DERIVED, of locations. this is 
often Jess than ENVIR_SUM because " 
specific siic may be lisicd more than once 
e.g. a dump in ANDOVER. CITY may be on 
the CERC:US, PLP, and m lists, so its 
ENVIR_SUM-= 3 while its SITE_ !OT AL = 
1 
93CON1RIB: Number, DERIVED, Fmal Contribution Tax 
Capacity 1993 
93DIS'IlUB: Number, DERIVED, Fmal Distribution Tax 
Capacity 1993 
93D_LESS_C: Number, DistribatiDD less Contribution 1993 
93%_DIFF: Number, (Disttibutioo less Contribution)/ 
Contribution er Difference as a % of 
Contn'bution 1993 
90CON1RIB: Number; D~. FuuJ Contribution Tax 
Capacity 1990 
8 1 
Original Source of Data 
METROPOLITAN COUNCII. 
MN POU..UTION CONTROL AGENCY 
MN POU..UTION CONTROL AGENCY 
MN POU..UTION CONTROL AGENCY 
MN POU..UTION CONTROL AGENCY 
MN POU..UTION CONTROL AGENCY 
MN POU..UTION CONTROL AGENCY 
MN POU..UTION CONTROL AGENCY 
MN POU..UTION CONTROL AGENCY 
MN POU..UTION CONTROL AGENCY 
MN POU..UTION CONTROL AGENCY 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE, 
Local Government Services Division 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE, 
Local Government Services Division . 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE, 
Local Government Services Division 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE, 
Local Government Services Division 
MN DEPARTMENT orREV-.cN'uc., 
Local Government Services Division 
Variable: Type, Description 
90DISTRIB: Number, DERIVED, Fmal Distribution Tax 
Capacity 1990 
90D_LESS_C: Number, Disttibution less Contribution 1990 
90%_DIFF: Number, (Disuibution less Contribution)/ 
Contributioo or Di.ffczencc IS a 'Ii of 
Contn"bution 1990 
85CONTRIB: Number, DERIVED, Final Contribution Tax 
Capacity 1985 
85DISTRIB: Number, DERIVED, Fmal Distribution Tax 
CapacitY 1985 
85D_LESS_C: Number, Distribution less Contribution 1985 
85%_DIFF: Number, (Disuibution less Contribution)/ 
Contribution or Di.ff czencc IS a % of 
Contn"bution 1985 
80CONTRIB: Number, DERIVED, Final Contribution Tax 
CapacitY 1980 
80D1S1RIB: Number, DERIVED, Final Distribution Tax 
CapacitY 1980 
80D_LESS_C: NWI)ber, Distribution less Contribution 1980 
80%_DIFF: Number, (Disaibution less Contribution)/ 
Contribution or Diffcrcnce as a % of 
Contnl>ution 1980 
NO_DIST92: Number, DERIVED, of Tax Increment 
Districts 1992 
TOTAL92: Number, DERIVED, Total Tax Increment 
Tax Capacity 1992 
CAPT_INCR92: Number, DERIVED, Captured Tax Capacity 
1992 
INC'92/I'OT92: Number, DERIVED, % of Total aaually 
captured 1992 
GROSS92: Number, DERIVED, Gross Tax Increment 
tax 1992-
CREDITS92: Number, DERIVED, Adjusunent to amcnt 
year tax by base YCM tax 1992 
NET_TAX92: Number, DERIVED, Tax Inacment Net 
Tax.. acmal moneys retmnod to MCD Tax 
Increment District 1992 
TOTAL90: Number, DERIVED, Total Tax lnacment 
Tax CapacitY 1990 
CAPT_INCR90: Number, DERIVED, Captured Tax Capacity 
1990 
INC90/TOT90: Number, DERIVED, 'Ii of Total actually 
captured 1990 
NET_TAX90: Number, DERIVED, Tax lnacment Net 
Tax, actual moneys ren.r..:.d to MCD Tax 
Increment District 1990 
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I 
I 
Original Source of Data I MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE, · 
Local Government Services Division 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE, I Local Government Services Division MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE. 
Local Government Scmces Division 
I MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE, 
Local Government Services Division 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE, I Local Government Services Division 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE, 
Local Government Services Division I MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE, 
Local Government Services Division 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE. I Local Government Services Division 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE, 
I Local Government Services Division MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE, 
Local Government Services Division 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE, I Local Government Services Division 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE. I Local Government Services Division 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE. 
Local Government Services Division I MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE, Local Government Services Division 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE. 
I Local Government Services Division MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE, 
Local Government Services Division 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE, I Local Government Services Division 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE, 
Local Government Services Division I 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE, 
. Local Government Services Division I MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE, Local Government Services Division 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE, I Local Government Services Division MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE, 
Local Government Services Division 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Variable : Type, Description 
TOTAL83: Number, DERIVED, Total Tax Increment 
Tax Capacity 1983, Asscssd values and not 
to be compared to post 1990 figures 
CAPT_INCR83: Number, DERIVED, Captured Tax Capacity 
1992, Asses.v:d value and not to be compared 
to post 1990 figures 
INC83/r0T83: Number, DERIVED, 'l, of Total actually 
captured 1993, this can be compared with 
post 1990 figures 
GROSS83: Number, DERIVED, Gross Tax Increment 
tax 1983 
CREDITS83: Number, DERIVED, Adjustmcit to current 
year tax by base ycar tax 1983 
NET83: Number, DERIVED, Tax Increment Net 
Tax, acmal moneys rctmned to MCD Tax 
IncrementDistrictl983 
A VETAX92: Number, The Average Tax ra1eS arc 
illustrative figures generally used for 
comparison purposes and arc not used to 
compute actual taxes on an individual 
p1oprny. Data available for cities only. 
TAXES_PAY90: Number, Taxes Payable 1990 Real and 
Personal Property Market Value. The airport 
& Fort Snelling arc combined and rcpone.d 
as FORT SNELLING UNORG and the State 
Fairgrounds were excluded 
83 
Original Source of Data 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE. 
Local Government Services Division 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE. 
Local Govemmcit Services Division 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE. 
Local Govcrnmcit Services Division 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE. 
. Local Government Services Division 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE. 
Local Government Services Division 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE. 
Local Government Services Division 
MN LEAGUE OF CITIES 
MN DEPARTMENT of REVENUE. 
Local Government Services Division 
Center for Urban and Regional Affairs 
University of Minnesota 
330 Hubert H. Humphrey Center 
301 19th Avenue South 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455 
(612) 625-1551 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
